Imagine a simple version of the game, with 8x8 squares, each of which is colored either solid white or solid black. We'll name the squares from the left to the right A through H; and we'll name those from the top to the bottom 1 through 8.
Imagine that at time 1 only A1 is black and the others are white. At time 2, the very next phase, B2 is the only one that is black, while all of the others are white. Then C3, then D4, etc.
Given the phi phenomenon, the onlooker will perceive this change as movement. But it isn't really.
At this level, we might call this Conway's Game of Physics, for it represents the sort of movement common to living and non-living things. But it is a rather limited representation. It's a toy version, and just as a toy gun leaves out that which does the real work, so does this toy version of physics. Just as someone who plays with a toy compensates for what is lacking in it by using his or her own imagination, so too one who plays the game of physics perceives movement by supplying (via the phi phenomenon) what is lacking in the representation.
Movement could never be "nothing but" matter that follows the transition rules found in this game. That is because, movement isn't just something that happens. Movement (even inertial movement) is an interplay of some sort. Rules don't just happen: things interact.
To represent the physical world in this way is to toy with physics: the same is true, a fortiori, of the Game of Life.
***
One who intends to build a board that enacts the transition rules has many different possible causal paths to choose from (electrical switches, mechanical switches, hydraulic switches, etc.). The underlying causal path is abstracted from by one who plays the game. To think that these transitions happen without any underlying causal mechanism is to mistake the game for reality. To look at nature at its most basic level (if there is such a thing) as consisting of nothing but Conway-like rule-governed transitions is likewise to confuse fiction with fact.
Imagine that at time 1 only A1 is black and the others are white. At time 2, the very next phase, B2 is the only one that is black, while all of the others are white. Then C3, then D4, etc.
Given the phi phenomenon, the onlooker will perceive this change as movement. But it isn't really.
At this level, we might call this Conway's Game of Physics, for it represents the sort of movement common to living and non-living things. But it is a rather limited representation. It's a toy version, and just as a toy gun leaves out that which does the real work, so does this toy version of physics. Just as someone who plays with a toy compensates for what is lacking in it by using his or her own imagination, so too one who plays the game of physics perceives movement by supplying (via the phi phenomenon) what is lacking in the representation.
Movement could never be "nothing but" matter that follows the transition rules found in this game. That is because, movement isn't just something that happens. Movement (even inertial movement) is an interplay of some sort. Rules don't just happen: things interact.
To represent the physical world in this way is to toy with physics: the same is true, a fortiori, of the Game of Life.
***
One who intends to build a board that enacts the transition rules has many different possible causal paths to choose from (electrical switches, mechanical switches, hydraulic switches, etc.). The underlying causal path is abstracted from by one who plays the game. To think that these transitions happen without any underlying causal mechanism is to mistake the game for reality. To look at nature at its most basic level (if there is such a thing) as consisting of nothing but Conway-like rule-governed transitions is likewise to confuse fiction with fact.
Comments