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Steve Pinker's mistaken, if I am not mistaking...

I regret to say that my recollection of Pinker's thoughts on thought is a bit foggy, but in spite of the uncertainty that attends this fog, I am willing to say that he claims that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the representations in our mind (or our knowledge) and the way the world is--between the way things are and the way our mind operates in order to know the world.

But this goes against the common sense conviction that the same thing can be taken in many different ways.  Take, for example, my regard for the color of my superfolder:  I can regard it as red, as simply being colored, as crimson, or as a having a sensible quality.  In order for me to consider this thing in these four different ways, four different things going on in my mind on the four different occasions when I know this one thing (in these four different ways).  That claim, however, leads to the following dilemma.

EITHER
 1. Pinker is correct in claiming that there is an isomorphic relationship between knowledge and the known.  In which case there would have to be four different things in reality corresponding to the four different ways in which I can know.   This alternative would undermine our common sense conviction that we can think of the same thing in many different ways.

OR
2. Pinker is wrong in claiming that  a one-to-one relationship between what goes on in my mind and what goes on in reality.  The latter alternative sits well with the common sense conviction that the same thing can be known in many different ways.  In which case, Pinker needs to account for how we can regard the same thing in different ways.  He needs to give an account of intentionality, interpretation, and the like... the sorts of things that a positivist seems to have forgotten.


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