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representations of hierarchical relations between powers

Aristotle talked about higher powers appropriating or encompassing the operations of lower powers in a manner analogous to the way in which a five-sided figure contains the makings of a four-sided figure--and more besides.  Well, that's a kind of model/game of life in which the higher and lower levels of operation are (albeit inadequately) represented.  But maybe there's a way of representing the Aristotlelian understanding of the hierarchy of powers.  Maybe that way is a kind of multidimensional representation, such that a line is seen as belonging to a plane, which in turn is seen as belonging to a solid, which itself is seen as being more than just the sum of many such planes.  The higher is in a sense  greater than the lower in this sort of analogy.  Is that an insight, or is that an example of "Analogies Gone Wild"?  Maybe there's some other way to convey, somewhat visually, the way powers are interrelated in a hylomorphic understanding of life forms.

Hmmmmmmmmmn...

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