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spheres and agency

Isn't Aristotle's notion of spheres and the intelligent beings that direct them as prime movers or unmoved movers (but not THE unmoved Mover)... isn't this a way of tipping his hat to something like polytheistic accounts of natural phenomena (the gods cause this and that natural phenomenon) but a non-materialistic version therof)? (but then again, Greeks don't wear hats...)

AND isn't the positing of one transcendent, utterly unmoved Mover  an affirmation of the existence of a supreme Being that is  like the Platonic Good as the supreme Being?

Three asides:

First the Good is not just another god--it is not just another being among the other "divine: beings, but is a kind of condition for the possibility of the being of the many divine beings).

Secondly, Aristotle's sort of Supreme Being is personal inasmuch as it is intelligent, but it is not exactly a personal being inamsuch as it is not personally involved in the day-to-day events going on in each corner of the universe...

The third aside is based upon the fact that Aristotle's argues from intermediate, personal "first" movers to the final cause of the operation of those moved movers.  Isn't this a kind of template for arguing for God on the basis of human agency?

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