I am wondering if it's possible to find a connection between a mechanistic view of the brain, and the notion that one needs to have one central headquarters, as it were, while associating the notion that one does not need a central headquarters to one that is non-mechanistic inasmuch as each part acts for the sake of a common good, as if they "desired" the same goal.
Of course, I would definitely have to defend the claim that mechanistic and central control view of consciousness go hand in hand. After all, DD seems to think (at this point in my auditing/reading) that a no-central-headquarters approach is consistent with his version of materialism (which I take as being reductionist with a kind of semblance of higher/lower levels of explanation).
One important objection to my common-good approach would be that I am using metaphor. And an important reply to that objection would be that "mechanism" is itself a metaphor. To suppose that it isn't is to suffer from a kind of amnesia: one who suffers from that needs to do a kind of epistemic (or perhaps more suitably, "gnoseological") geneology.
In any case, while listening to the Companion to Philosophy of Biology way, way back when, I noted that more contemporary understandings of DNA avoid locking down functions as if one part is just for reading information, while another part is just the message (discrete gene?) to be read, while yet another part is just the transmitter, etc. Instead, there is a free-flowing relationship between the parts: they take turns doing their respective roles. In other words, there is an analogy between this sort of free-flowing taking-turns and what goes on in the brain.
It is very likely I've posted this before: I found some google voice messages that I'm transcribing from at least a year ago. Maybe I wrote it better this time...
Of course, I would definitely have to defend the claim that mechanistic and central control view of consciousness go hand in hand. After all, DD seems to think (at this point in my auditing/reading) that a no-central-headquarters approach is consistent with his version of materialism (which I take as being reductionist with a kind of semblance of higher/lower levels of explanation).
One important objection to my common-good approach would be that I am using metaphor. And an important reply to that objection would be that "mechanism" is itself a metaphor. To suppose that it isn't is to suffer from a kind of amnesia: one who suffers from that needs to do a kind of epistemic (or perhaps more suitably, "gnoseological") geneology.
In any case, while listening to the Companion to Philosophy of Biology way, way back when, I noted that more contemporary understandings of DNA avoid locking down functions as if one part is just for reading information, while another part is just the message (discrete gene?) to be read, while yet another part is just the transmitter, etc. Instead, there is a free-flowing relationship between the parts: they take turns doing their respective roles. In other words, there is an analogy between this sort of free-flowing taking-turns and what goes on in the brain.
It is very likely I've posted this before: I found some google voice messages that I'm transcribing from at least a year ago. Maybe I wrote it better this time...
Comments
If that is all we are, then what appears to be a scientist doesn't really exist. Then neither does science.
Haven't you heard: self-referential functionality IS teleology.
Much of what you have to say seems like summaries of complex arguments that you've thought out. Since I don't know the whole version of the argument, I can't tell whether you are engaged in insightful observations or sloppy thinking. I prefer to think the former, but I think that throwing out summaries as you shows a lack of interest in having a conversation: you seem to want to talk at me about the things your already know rather than talk with me about the things we can come to know together. The former sounds tedious; the latter, exciting. I invite you to choose the latter: it's much more fun.