a big problem with my thesis re abstraction

this is a short note I'm jotting down just to myself regarding a potentially fatal flaw in my thesis re abstraction

Concept=H
Phantasm at time one=P1
Phantasm at time two=P2

Given: that P1 is not identical to P2
But P1 is isomorphic with H
and P2 is likewise isomorphic with H

How could all of this be consistent?

Only if both Ps have H as a kind of inner focal point, so that this focal point is itself isomorphic in both cases YET the non-focal points are aliomorphic (if there is such a word).

Only if we can de reify the relation between H and P can the theory be salvaged.

Simply stating the need to do so does not establish that it is so.

Comments

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The Human Question

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