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ought/is, John Searle, implict/explicit promises and solidarity

I've just glimpsed at the article (How to Derive Ought from Is, by John R. Searle, The Philosophical Review, vol.73, no. 1), so my opinion about it is almost guaranteed to be be subject to revision...

But it seems to me that making a promise does cocreate an ought.  But I might add that the very act of living in community whose members understand themselves and each other as cooperating in achieving a common life, the sharing of which is itself regarded as inherently desirable.... the very act of living together under such circumstances, while not being a promise, achieves much of what a promise achieves in terms of expectations from others.  Treat it as an implicit promise if you will: I am not committing to that, but I am committing to its being like a promise.  In any case, my point is that this quasi-promise likewise creates certain oughts.  Another derivation of ought from is, but the "is" in this case is "being one of us" or something like that.

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