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a few howlers among the many worthwhile things Dembski says

I am surprised and impressed at how well-argued much of this book is.  But the following things said by him in The Design Revolution seem quite propagandistic, nutty, creationist or a combination thereof

1. That "Darwinism" (the very use of this name is, in my opinion, problematic, because Darwin made use not only of his own explanatory mechanism but that of Lamark) makes no predictions other than vague ones about the pathways of evolution.

I would reply by saying that there are many pre/retro -dictions that neo-Darwinians have made and had confirmed.  But the only currency Dembski is accepting is precise knowledge of the mutations that brought about macro evolution. He is not giving credit at all where an enormous amount is due.

To make this objection I must distinguish between predictions that could have been made simply on the basis of the acceptance of descent with modifications (i.e., a prediction that could as easily have been made by a  Lamarkian or possibly a self-organization theorist) from those predictions that rely precisely on random variation--and not at all upon any competing hypothesis--to explain the origin of novel phenotypes.

Here is one prediction that is momentous that only random variation could have predicted (even though, as a matter of historical fact, it didn't): genes.  No one predicted that, but a Darwinian could have.  Perhaps the reason why no one did is because even Darwin himself accepted Lamark's notion of use and disuse as a partial explanation of speciation.

Darwinians had plenty of reason to posit genes, even in an ad hoc fashion, to support what I call strong random variation (that it alone is the cause of novel life forms).  For at that time folks talked about the problem of blending (the belief, for example, that a tall dad and short mom will have an average height child).  No one produced any data to defend the claim that blending occurs.  Had they done so, they would have discovered that it is a pseudo-problem.  And they could have posited something like genes to explain why blending DOESN'T occur.

Another point.  Dembski is arguing against even strong variationists having made any predictions that could not have been predicted by alternative explanations of descent with modification, saying that they give only promissory notes.  But that's all scientists do.  Or rather whenever they cash in OLD ones they always take out a NEW one.  That's the nature of science.

Still, it seems true that no precise pathway for macro-evolution has been proposed.  Then again, neither has an ID shown exactly at what point the preternatural or supernatural engineer is supposed to have influenced the development of diverse life forms. ID too, offers promissory notes.  And some would say that they are junk bonds.  And others would point out that yesterday's junk bonds are tomorrow's Microsoft stock shares.  And others still would point out that Microsoft is being overshadowed by Apple.

So point #1 is that this remark is unfounded.  And it's easy to imagine that its purpose is propagandistic.

2. That ID predicts extinction.  It's hard to believe that ID would have a uniquely ID insight into this.. Unless he thinks the intelligent designer(s) is/are tinkerers, in which case he should call it NSID or Not-so-intelligent-design

Then again, I am not claiming that extinction is an embarrassment to ID: only that it seems unlikely that ID's distinctive claims will shed light on this occurrence.

I think of this as an example of hand-waving.

3. While discussing Behe's work, Dembski compares the search for plausible precursors to irreducibly complex structures (I believe he uses Behe's vocabulary in this chapter) to the search made by parents for leprechauns said to be spotted by their child.  This is a silly comparison.  Scientists have SOME reason for supposing that there are indirect pathways leading to the present life forms: they have this evidence in micro-evolution.  So it's nothing like the child's claim to have seen a leprechaun.  It's based, rather, on something that they HAVE seen.

Propagandistic.

4. He says that Of Pandas and People is a "terrific" book.  Well, if its true (as the trial in Delaware made manifest) that PAP is nothing but a creationist book with some word changes (as was), then it is hard to imagine that it is terrific at all.

Creationist. What he is doing at this point in this book is reassuring the creationists that what they cherish does not have to be set aside.

5. He talks about a kind of cryptology that would look for messages from God in biology (in junk dna, perhaps?).

Mucho nutty.

6. He talks about the gaps in the fossil record as if that were an embarrassment to evolutionary theory and proposes that ID will be able to explain these as signs of discontinuities.  This makes me strongly suspicious that he rejects descent from a common ancestor or at least that he has written this book for creationists.  Of course, this is only a suspicion... I need to look carefully at how he worded this part of his text.

7. Back to his decision not to take a position on creationism.  He is writing a document that will help forge a unity between the young earthers and those who believe evolution is true. Inasmuch as unity in the movement is the goal of this book, it has "political" overtones.

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