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the subjectivist fallacy and the theism/atheism debate

One justification often offered by believers sounds something like this, "If I didn't believe in God then my life would have no meaning, but I can't life without meaning; therefore, I believe in God."  As stated it seems to be something like, "I feel like thinking this way, therefore I do so."   But it is helpful to compare this argument to the following argument, which commits no such fallacy:

"If my life is meaningful, then there is a meaning for every other thing and for the totality as well; but my life does have meaning; therefore..."

The above argument relies upon the reflective recognition of one's own life as being meaningful as a basic truth.  But it links this to a claim that goes beyond the individual who makes the reflection.  And the logical form is such that, to deny the consequent (i.e., that "there is a meaning for every other thing and for the totality as well") is to deny the antecedent (i.e., that "my life is meaningful").  

We can look at the so-called subjectivist argument for theism as a confused version of the above.

The real debate, then is the relationship between the meaningfulness of my life and that of the totality.

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