My take-home from listening recently to a book on Wittgenstein was that there is always something in our language game that cannot be reduced to or captured in rules.
Perhaps that something more is the way desire directs our movement. Desire is a condition for the possibility of having even implicit rules. Explicit rules for human behavior cannot really move us to act: they only steer our desires.
Perhaps "rules" signify whatever can be explained mechanistically, but Wittgenstein might add that such an explanation is never a complete one. Just as to describe a machine in terms of its physics without saying what it is for is to fail to describe it as a machine, so too, one can never give a complete account of nature in merely mechanistic terms.
Perhaps that something more is the way desire directs our movement. Desire is a condition for the possibility of having even implicit rules. Explicit rules for human behavior cannot really move us to act: they only steer our desires.
Perhaps "rules" signify whatever can be explained mechanistically, but Wittgenstein might add that such an explanation is never a complete one. Just as to describe a machine in terms of its physics without saying what it is for is to fail to describe it as a machine, so too, one can never give a complete account of nature in merely mechanistic terms.
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I look forward to reading your other posts... hopefully tomorrow.
"There are already context free languages which consist entirely of mathematical rules."
Every mathematical language can be imagined to be context free and consisting entirely of mathematical rules. But the only reason why we turn to mathematics is because of desire. The only reason why we come up with new versions of mathematics is because of desire. Rules can very rightly be seen as directions for getting what you desire. Rules therefore presuppose desire. And desire always involves a practical context: the mathematician always does math because he or she desires something here and now. Desire is, if you will, a condition for the possibility of the intelligibility of math.
"The mere fact that all people understand language to begin with is a fact consistent with learning those rules."
Wittgenstein isn't denying the existence of rules within language, so pointing out the existence of rules is not contradicting him. Nor is it surprising to him: his point is that such rules involve something more that cannot be expressed in the form of rules.
"There's nothing mysterious about language apart from its obvious sloppiness and imprecision."
I think that we need to approach these topics with the sense that there is more to reality than we presently know. Reality is more interesting when we approach it that way. "There is nothing mysterious about...": excuse me, I would never say that about anything.
What I just wrote applies to pretty much the rest of what you said: "the whole of language lies in its reduction." At this point, I think your confidence shines through but not much that is illuminating for me.
"Language IS rule based": I think Wittgenstein's point is that it is not. To assert that it is so is not to give an argument.
"Human emotions are causative." Well, "causative" is an equivocal term from my perspective, but I'm sure you have something very precise in mind--namely the contrast between "causative" and "rule-based."
I propose that in this discussion we reserve "emotions" for a third person perspective and "desire" for a first person perspective. Wittgenstein is talking from a first person perspective (that is, first person plural, not from a private point of view/introspection). I suppose (correct me if I'm wrong) you are talking from the third person perspective (i.e., from the perspective of a scientist looking at someone else's report of having desires while measuring brain activity, etc.).
You may suppose that the third person perspective trumps the first person. But Wittgenstein offers insights, I believe, that prove otherwise.
Replying to W by pointing out the authority of science, with an act of FAITH ("the 'causative nature' of emotions is not completely elucidated..."), is circular.
As for Goedel's theorum: yes, that's relevant. And people who are smarter than me think it undermines materialism. And other people who are smarter than me think it doesn't. As soon as I understand it, I'll discuss it with you. Meanwhile, don't hold your breath.