While listening to a recorded lecture on Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, it occurred to me that every rule is in a way, a fact about the world. Think about baseball: from the p.o.v. of an individual player, a baseball rule is not a thing but a guide for acting and interpreting the actions of others. But this rule, like the action it guides, is part of a concrete individual --i.e., part of an institution that has come into existence at a particular place and time, has endured and may eventually go out of existence. The baseball rule, as a feature of that individual, is likewise individual. The term "baseball rule," on the one hand, links us to a unique cultural event; it can, on the other hand, name a certain type of being. In this way, it transgresses the boundary between proper and common noun. If there were no such overlap, then we might be tempted to divide our ontology between a bunch of facts "out there" and a bunch of common nouns "in here....
Comments
For starters, the equation by McCulloch doesn't mean anything to me: what's dQ?
The equations aren't really important in that article. dX (where X in any variable) is essentially synonymous with delta_x, or change in X. dX means a small change in X. Technically, dX is an infinitesimally small change in X - this assumption is the basis of calculus. What that equation means in words is that if you add a small amount of heat energy to a closed system otherwise kept at constant temperature, you will likely contribute to it's disorder. This, if I hold an ice cube and put a lighter by it (adding the dQ), some of it will melt into water - thus ruining its order and increasing its entropy (corresponding to an increase in S on the other side of the equation).