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infinite number of possible world's and the undermining of rationality

Bill Dembski has a witty argument that, if you posit an infinite number worlds exist, all talk about probability breaks down. I may not have his argument just right, but here goes. In one possible universe, Rubenstein sits down an hits keys randomly on the piano, but beautiful music comes out. How do you know that you are not in that universe? Etc.

He seems to be onto something. But what would he say about the possibility that we live in an infinitely old and oscillating universe? With an infinite number of future possible universe scenarios, wouldn't the same thing happen as he described with an infinite number of universes? So if he were confronted with this question would he be forced to argue as well that we live in a finitely aged universe? If he said "no," would this response weaken the point he made with the Arthur Rubinstein example? (mentioned in earlier post)
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Unknown said…
Would this be consonant with what you wrote: anthropic principle understandings of cosmic history (involving a multiverse) are an attempt to make the capital-U Universe completely Copernican. But hasn't the existence of a special point in *time* (namely, the big bang) already violated this?
12:30 AM
Leo White said…
Looking at Dembski's argument much later on, it seems trivial: one could posit a similar question without mentioning either a multiverse or infinitely aged universe. The question is basically, "How do you know that your knowledge of the laws of nature is so incomplete that something seemingly random may occur in the next moment? Problem of induction.
11:04 AM
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