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exotic vs plausible counterexamples

After I listened to a philosopher bring up a thought experiment involving the Star-Trek teleporter thought experiments, it occurred to me that less exotic thought experiments are preferable to those involving processes that only happen in science fiction.  In fact, I'll illustrate my point by using nothing other than a (rather mundane) thought experiment.

Suppose two philosophers are debating what is for philosophers a hot topic, be it personal identity, divine foreknowledge, the existence of moral absolutes or whatever.  Each tries to refute the other by coming up with a counterexample.  One of them uses a very exotic example of something that happens only in science fiction and whose possibility is doubtful; the other uses an example taken from every day life. Suppose also that each of these counterexamples seems to uncover a weakness in the other's point of view.

Other things being equal, the more mundane counterexample counts for more, because it is more consonant with Ockham's razor than the exotic one.  That is, the mundane one only asks us to consider a scenario that could easily have happened;  the exotic one requires that we believe in the possibility of what may well be impossible (as in teletransporters). Such thought experiments do not suffice to provide a basis for criticizing someone else's beliefs.

A counter-counterexample.  Suppose that teletransporters are impossible: how would you devise an experiment to determine whether or not that is so.  If you cannot devise such an experiment, then neither can you draw a definitive conclusions that presume such teletransporters are possible.

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