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logocentrism, scientism, atheism, Chesterton, any stick will do to beat a dog

Fifteen years ago, deconstructionists attacked theism, I think for its daring to come up with a comprehensive account of reality.  Today, Sean Carroll and his like say that the very questions which lead to such comprehensive answers should be disallowed.  It seems that both groups of anti-theists have in common this opposition to wonder, as is classically conceived.  But they also disagree with each other: deconstructionsts would attack science's claim to be able to come up with objective answers (this may have to do with the term "logocentrism": I don't know); hence the famous "science wars."

Deconstructionism would make us all fideists of a sort, whereas the other brand of anti-theism advocates scientific rationalism.  If so, then theism has been attacked by one group (the quasi-fideists) for being too boldly rational; and later for its perceived opposition to reason.  This reminds me of Chesterton's remark (I think in Orthodoxy) that upon noting how the Church has been criticized for being both too sensate, too ascetic, etc., Chesterton began to suspect that it had perhaps gotten things just right--which is what he did discover once he investigated the mater.I need to review deconstruction in order to see if the Chestertonian come-back would be applicable to the last couple of decades of anti-theism.

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