That is, one who thinks that Benjamin Libbet's experiment could be used to disprove the existence of any free choice whatsoever has not thought clearly about the various contexts in which we may find ourselves making a choice. Common to those contexts is a prior deliberation that follows upon an oftentimes creative exploration of different possible courses of action.
When we look different choices made at different times, we see that they vary to a very great degree and that this difference may be quite relevant to the question of freedom. In fact, it may be that some choices seem freer than others. Consider how the agent may consider different courses of action solely in instrumental terms, i.e., neither as desirable or undesirable in themselves. In another situation, however, the agent may be deciding between means that are themselves instrinsically desirable or undesirable. Consider also how the goal that spurs deliberation may be something of only very immediate significance or it may have to do with the point of one's whole life. As we go from younger to older, from more selfish to more generous, from vicious to virtuous, we may become better at making choices that are fulfilling, and in that sense we may be freer to attain what we are ultimately seeking. These considerations suggest that freedom is better thought of as an achievement rather than as an underlying property. Our inquiry into the nature of freedom must note the differences to be found in the ends and means that we are considering when deliberating and choosing. Without noting these differences, we run the risk of talking about freedom in a manner that is so abstract, that it fails to be applicable to any concrete choices. That, unfortunately, is precisely what happened to Daniel Dennett and to others who draw conclusions about the nature or existence of freedom from Benjamin Libbet's experiment.
When we look different choices made at different times, we see that they vary to a very great degree and that this difference may be quite relevant to the question of freedom. In fact, it may be that some choices seem freer than others. Consider how the agent may consider different courses of action solely in instrumental terms, i.e., neither as desirable or undesirable in themselves. In another situation, however, the agent may be deciding between means that are themselves instrinsically desirable or undesirable. Consider also how the goal that spurs deliberation may be something of only very immediate significance or it may have to do with the point of one's whole life. As we go from younger to older, from more selfish to more generous, from vicious to virtuous, we may become better at making choices that are fulfilling, and in that sense we may be freer to attain what we are ultimately seeking. These considerations suggest that freedom is better thought of as an achievement rather than as an underlying property. Our inquiry into the nature of freedom must note the differences to be found in the ends and means that we are considering when deliberating and choosing. Without noting these differences, we run the risk of talking about freedom in a manner that is so abstract, that it fails to be applicable to any concrete choices. That, unfortunately, is precisely what happened to Daniel Dennett and to others who draw conclusions about the nature or existence of freedom from Benjamin Libbet's experiment.
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