Below is my response to P F Strawson (I summarized him in a prior post).
PF Strawson argues that one who believes in determinism will continue to engage in interpersonal relationships in a manner that shows concern about morality; therefore, the libertarian argument against determinism is undermined, for it claims that determinism is at odds with morality.
I will argue (or rather, in this blog post I will sketch an argument to the effect) that while a vague belief in determinism may be able to coexist with moral convictions, neither desire, moral convictions nor positive freedom (that is, freedom as defined in Strawson's essay) could come into existence if a specific form of determinism were true. Key to this argument is the claim that there is not just one kind of determinism but many, which vary according to the various ways in which one might attempt to justify this claim. A theist who is committed to determinism, for example, might give metaphysical reasons for thinking that the operation of the human will is predetermined by a provident Deity; a neo-Platonic determinist might argue that human volition originates from a higher immaterial being whose existence and operation is itself the result of an emanation from a still higher being, etc., all of which ultimately emanates necessarily from a non-provident Deity; a non-reductive materialist who is committed to determinism might argue that human volition results in a lawlike manner from the interaction of a human being with its environment; and a reductive determinist (i.e., a reductive materialist who is committed to determinism) would argue that the operation of the will is predetermined by antecedent material conditions.
Although there are many kinds of determinism, my argument focuses only on how determinism cannot rely upon a reductively materialist justification, because the reductive materialist account of desire, free will, and moral convictions is false. I leave untouched the question of whether some other form of determinism may be compatible with positive freedom. In this way, my argument's central conclusion does not so much contradict PF Strawson's conclusion as marginalize it. It concedes that one who comes to believe in determinism will find it natural to continue adhering to moral convictions and that determinism generaliter may be consistent with belief in a positive free will (as defined by Strawson). But reductive determinism, precisely because it is reductive, is not compatible with free will inasmuch as no such will could exist.
Although there are many kinds of determinism, my argument focuses only on how determinism cannot rely upon a reductively materialist justification, because the reductive materialist account of desire, free will, and moral convictions is false. I leave untouched the question of whether some other form of determinism may be compatible with positive freedom. In this way, my argument's central conclusion does not so much contradict PF Strawson's conclusion as marginalize it. It concedes that one who comes to believe in determinism will find it natural to continue adhering to moral convictions and that determinism generaliter may be consistent with belief in a positive free will (as defined by Strawson). But reductive determinism, precisely because it is reductive, is not compatible with free will inasmuch as no such will could exist.
One question not yet addressed is whether some version of non-reductive materialism could both avoid the reductionism's incoherence and provide a justification either for determinism or for its contrary. Instead of arguing that determinism is true or false, I will argue that the correct answer hinges upon a more adequate definition of freedom than Strawson's "positive freedom." A phenomenology of practical reasoning shows that we have reasons for our choices, but those reasons do not determine which choice we make. Determinism seems less plausible to the degree that one takes this indetermination in our reasons as an indetermination in re; determinism seems more plausible inasmuch as one regards this indetermination as a surface phenomenon, with determining factors being at work under the surface.
Digression: I love how Strawson rightly avoids justifying the truth of moral convictions. It is clear that for him, the meaningfulness as well as truth of such convictions is to be found only by one who is concerned about the attitude of others, and that this concern arises as a result of one's interactions with others. He calls this concern a "participatory" attitude, for one who takes on this attitude participates in community life. This anti-foundationalist approach seems right on target. I would suggest, however, that moral convictions arising from interpersonal interactions lead us to expect to find other rational agents who have already arrived at the same conclusion, so that to adopt such convictions is inseparable from identifying oneself as a member of the community of rational agents, a community whose membership is open-ended and may even extend beyond humanity itself.
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