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response to a question posed by a former student, about why the objectivity of moral truths points to God

The original question concerned how our ability to know objective moral truths points to God.  By "objective," my student meant the that many agree about at least some moral truths.  "How does that necessarily point to God?" he asked.

One key thing to keep in mind is what "moral objectivity" means.  You would be shortchanging this concept if you thought that it meant only that we tend to have similar judgments, either because he have reached an agreement or because he happen to evolved in a similar way.  Let's compare it to mathematical objectivity.  When I know that 3+7=10 I know an objective truth.  When I reflect on that knowledge, I recognize that there is something amazing going on: I know not only that it's true for me, but that there's something about it that couldn't be otherwise--regardless of whether or not anyone in my life had told me so.  If somewhere else in the cosmos, someone else claims to know that 3+7=10 is false, I know that they are wrong; or joking; or that I am misunderstanding their symbol system (maybe "=" means "Unequal" for them, or "3" means what we mean by "2."  If one were to propose that somewhere else in the universe people have evolved to deny that 3+7=10, then I would say, well, they've evolved to believe something untrue, and they are not being helped by this untruth, unless believing untruth is helpful.

So claiming that knowledge is objective isn't the same as claiming that many people tend to come up with the same judgment.  To put it in another way, it would be plausible to say that many people agree that 3+7=10 because it is objectively true, whereas it would be wrong-headed to say that the truth of 3+7=10 is objective because many agree about it.

Once one recognizes that some moral convictions are objectively true in the sense that I have sketched above, one finds compelling reasons for believing in God.  That was the case for C S Lewis, for Alisdair MacIntyre (one of the most important moral philosophers of the 20th century and who is still alive) and for Leah Libresco https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l1F35ExQnVE), for Jennifer Fulweiler (http://whyimcatholic.com/index.php/conversion-stories/atheist-converts/item/103-atheist-convert-jennifer-fulwiler) and for many others.

One of the evidences provided by moral objectivity has to do not so much with the "moral" as with the "objectivity."  The very fact that we human beings are able to know ANY objective truth IS objective (be it mathematical or otherwise) points our being more than a complex combination of chemicals.  It indicates in this way that the sort of materialism that would reduce humanity to this is false.  And once you recognize your dignity as a human being, as something more than chemicals, you are in a sense forced to look upwards for an answer to the question that your own human dignity.

Consider how objective truths are not just true here and now, not just true for some humans, but for all humans at all times.  In knowing these truths that transcend the limits of time and space, we make it apparent that there is something about ourselves that transcends those limits as well: we are more than clusters of chemicals, as our act of knowing these sorts of truths is something more than a very localized physical process.  We are more than that.  Compared to chemical clusters, we are like gods.  Yet our superiority to mere chemicals comes from our ability to turn to something else, to something that in a sense judges us and tells us how things must be: our superiority comes from our ability to discover and to be GUIDED in our judgments by objective truth.

St. Augustine made a big deal about how the human capacity to know objective truth is a kind of connection to God, who is the ultimate source of truth--so ultimate, that it makes sense to call God Truth itself.  

I am only sketching an argument that can be filled in greater detail later.  Let me move on to another point.

The second point I'd like to make about objective moral truths has to do with the "moral" in "objective moral truths."
 
When you recognize objective moral truths, you recognize that there is something objectively valuable about yourself.  That is, to the degree that anyone has an adequate grasp of reality in all of its facts, they will recognize that you deserve to be treated with respect.  Actually, the word "valuable" in the expression "objectively valuable" is problematic, for when we say something is valuable, you normally assign a dollars and cents number to that value.  And anything that can be assigned a dollars and cents type of value can be disposed of in favor of something more valuable.  If I hear a man  say that fidelity to his wife is valuable to him, then I become concerned--"for how much money or other thing of value would you be willing to be unfaithful?"  If he gives a dollar amount or names something else (fame, power, popularity) for which he'd be willing to sacrifice his fidelity, then I would say that he is not really respecting his wife or his commitment--or himself.  

Bottom line: there is something about yourself and about others that is beyond the value calculus.  The fancy name for that something is "human dignity." Once you recognize your own dignity as a human being (which is inseparable from recognizing the dignity of others), you see yourself standing above the type of materialistic calculus of values that puts a price on everything, that looks at everything only in terms of its utility.  You are seeing something infinitely more valuable than the things that one can buy or sell.  

Once you see yourself as a member of the community of persons, each of whom has what I have called "human dignity," it is natural to ask questions such as "where does this dignity come from?"  and "where does this dignity point to?"  The answer to these questions is "God."  God is the source of this transcendent value we find in ourselves; God is the one we are most seeking.  

I am moving way too fast in my reasoning: I'm just giving a sketch.  But if you think of what I've written as a "research program" and reflect on it, you'll be able to figure out how all of my argument sketches can be filled out.

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