What if different patients who have undergone a severing of the corpus callosum report two different scenarios (under different circumstances, assumedly):
1. the situation in which they are able to perceive both with right and left brain inputs, but cannot relate the two together (e.g., cannot name a pencil that one's hand is touching, because the hand that is touching it is not continuous with the language-using part of the brain).
2. the situation in which they are conscious of what is going on in one half but not of the other, and in which the other is engaged in a kind of mutiny against the first.
If both of these results occur, then it would seem that the first result is sufficient to show the unifying role of something like the soul; while the second might be explainable in terms of part of the brain displaying a sub-cognitive functionality.
1. the situation in which they are able to perceive both with right and left brain inputs, but cannot relate the two together (e.g., cannot name a pencil that one's hand is touching, because the hand that is touching it is not continuous with the language-using part of the brain).
2. the situation in which they are conscious of what is going on in one half but not of the other, and in which the other is engaged in a kind of mutiny against the first.
If both of these results occur, then it would seem that the first result is sufficient to show the unifying role of something like the soul; while the second might be explainable in terms of part of the brain displaying a sub-cognitive functionality.
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