I'll translate the following into regular English some other day, when I have the time:
The concept of appropriation (see dissertation's discussion of Aquinas's commentary on De sensu) can be used to answer the objection that split brain (which results from the severing of the corpus callosum) is a counter-example to the notion of the soul. Actually, the split-brain objection may be effective against genuine dualism, but hylomorphism can, with the help of the concept of appropriation (the latter being a component of the former), not only deal with this important counter-example, but also deal with what is quite an embarrassment to reductive materialism: the unity of consciousness in a person with an intact corpus callosum.
The concept of appropriation (see dissertation's discussion of Aquinas's commentary on De sensu) can be used to answer the objection that split brain (which results from the severing of the corpus callosum) is a counter-example to the notion of the soul. Actually, the split-brain objection may be effective against genuine dualism, but hylomorphism can, with the help of the concept of appropriation (the latter being a component of the former), not only deal with this important counter-example, but also deal with what is quite an embarrassment to reductive materialism: the unity of consciousness in a person with an intact corpus callosum.
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