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Different possible relations between non-reductive physicalism and the God question

A non-reductive physicalist could say that he or she sees no evidence of God's existence, nor does he/she see evidence of any other immaterial being's existence; therefore, it seems that there is no God.  Or he/she might adopt a soft agnosticism (a soft agnostic is open, a hard agnostic says, "I can't know, and neither can you")    To either of these physicalists,  I would reply, "Here's my evidence/argument..."

A non-reductive physicalist might say there is no God because of the problem of evil/pain.  To that I would reply, "You misunderstand what is meant by 'God': God is not thought of as an engineer or manager, but as an agent who is the source of our entire world's entire existence."

A non-reductive physicalist might say that there can be no God because there can be no immaterial being.  To which I would reply, "Why not?"  The response would (I expect) belie the sort of assumptions that are proper to a reductive materialist.  I would look for those assumptions, point them out, and point out their inconsistency with the non-reductive position.  Also, I might point out the ways in which we truly seem to transcend the limits of space and time through our knowledge, desire and communicative acts.  That sort of transcendence is likely a counter-example to the premises upon which the non-reductive physicalist bases his/her claim that the immaterial can't exist.  I am not sure, however, of whether one needs to argue that we are in any sense immaterial prior to arguing that we are directed toward and by an immaterial reality that corresponds to what is typically associated with the divine.



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