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problems and opportunities with DD's (Daniel Dennett's) multiple drafts account of consciousness

I haven't a clear idea of his multiple drafts account, but it seems to me that according to DD, we take what we previously cognized and recognize it with some modification.  So instead of having an enduring ego, you have different drafts at different times of what you perceive and the later ones take into account what you perceived in the earlier draft.

I would like to run a bit in a different direction with the draft metaphor by pointing out how drafts involve sentences, which involve words, which involve letters.  Among these components and sub components are elements that are related to each other in a founding/founded manner, with the founded being irreducible to the founding.

Lemmee try to say that again, this time without (probably misusing) Husserlian terms: letters/words and words/sentences are related to each other as are part to whole, with the whole having something to it that is more than the sum of the parts.  This should be recognized in the "draft" metaphor.  But to do so might be anti-reductionistic.  It certainly involves appropriation.

But even supposing one does not recognize the letter/word; word/sentence relation and its appropriateness as a metaphor for the relation among the elements of perception, it is still clear that there's a kind of appropriation in DD's account ( "appropriation" is the metaphor I introduced in my dissertation for the relation of the operation of the sensus communis to the operations of the proper senses).

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