I am writing this with unfair moves made by evangelical atheists in mind:
Suppose the laws themselves may change through time: if they do, the way in which they change is itself a law of nature. And if there are many such laws, then the way in which the laws themselves are related to each other might be a kind of law of nature. So that there is one ultimate law of nature, the knowledge of which would explain everything else.
Suppose the laws that we know do not change through time: then one arrives at the conclusion regarding one ultimate law even more quickly.
To one who sees the connection between the laws we observe an this one supreme law, the following conditional is true:
if the more obvious laws are true, then the supreme but least obvious one is true.
The contrapositive is likewise true:
If the supreme but least obvious law is not true, then neither are the purportedly more obvious laws.
What is logically prior (what is known first by us) is the law or set of laws describing more obvious patterns of changes. What is ontologically prior is the law underlying all other laws: it is known later on but it is more fundamental than the rest. To really understand that there is such a fundamental law is to see how the more obvious ones entail it.
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The difference between logical priority and ontological priority is pretty much parallel to what we see in theistic reasoning.
The theist reasons thus: if there is teleological motion, order in causality, a universe in which there is some contingency but continuity in being, degrees of goodness (and if each of these is interwoven with the rest), then there is a supreme source of each of these.
The contrapositive is likewise true: if there is no supreme Being, then there is no change, no order in causality etc.
In both cases, to oppose the conclusion (there is a most fundamental law; there is a supreme Being) by arguing that the adherent is trying to infer the obvious (there is this or that law; there is an order of causality) from the non-obvious (from the fundamental law; from the Supreme Being) is to argue unfairly: it is to confuse the ontological priority stated in the contrapositive version with the logical priority stated in the other, original version (in which it is stated that if the more obvious but less fundamental reality exists, then the less obvious one exists).
Suppose the laws themselves may change through time: if they do, the way in which they change is itself a law of nature. And if there are many such laws, then the way in which the laws themselves are related to each other might be a kind of law of nature. So that there is one ultimate law of nature, the knowledge of which would explain everything else.
Suppose the laws that we know do not change through time: then one arrives at the conclusion regarding one ultimate law even more quickly.
To one who sees the connection between the laws we observe an this one supreme law, the following conditional is true:
if the more obvious laws are true, then the supreme but least obvious one is true.
The contrapositive is likewise true:
If the supreme but least obvious law is not true, then neither are the purportedly more obvious laws.
What is logically prior (what is known first by us) is the law or set of laws describing more obvious patterns of changes. What is ontologically prior is the law underlying all other laws: it is known later on but it is more fundamental than the rest. To really understand that there is such a fundamental law is to see how the more obvious ones entail it.
***
The difference between logical priority and ontological priority is pretty much parallel to what we see in theistic reasoning.
The theist reasons thus: if there is teleological motion, order in causality, a universe in which there is some contingency but continuity in being, degrees of goodness (and if each of these is interwoven with the rest), then there is a supreme source of each of these.
The contrapositive is likewise true: if there is no supreme Being, then there is no change, no order in causality etc.
In both cases, to oppose the conclusion (there is a most fundamental law; there is a supreme Being) by arguing that the adherent is trying to infer the obvious (there is this or that law; there is an order of causality) from the non-obvious (from the fundamental law; from the Supreme Being) is to argue unfairly: it is to confuse the ontological priority stated in the contrapositive version with the logical priority stated in the other, original version (in which it is stated that if the more obvious but less fundamental reality exists, then the less obvious one exists).
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