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What if...? neurology, brain, brain damage at or near birth, frontal lobe

I've heard of someone functioning very normally even though most of their brain was crowded out by a large swelling that occurred very early in their development.  Apparently, the brain developed all of its functions with the neurons that remained.

So this makes me wonder about whether some or all of the functions that we associate with different areas of the brain are where they are because their location, neuron-type and function have been pretty much pre-selected genetically OR whether activity/behavior affects or even directs development.

Also, I wonder specifically about the frontal lobe: if that area of the brain were crowded out of existence even before birth by a swelling, then would some other part of the brain that remains come to perform the frontal lobe functions?  Would that part become fully myelinated only in the mid twenties (as is the case with us)?

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