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Mathematical objects, moral ideals, God

What is the object of mathematics?  Does it require that we posit a kind of fiction?  Does it direct us toward Platonic objects?

The sort of functional analysis of theism that has been employed by some evolutionary psychologists would, if applied to math, treat it as dealing with fictions.  But it doesn't.  Less respect for theism begets less respect for math; more respect for math begets more respect for theism.

Once upon a time I learned how Wittgenstein understood math.  Unfortunately that understanding has grown fuzzy.  But I think that for LW (Ludwig Wittgenstein, not Leo White :)), learning math is being initiated into a practicing community: it's learning "how we do things."  That's no problem to my thesis that more respect for math begets more respect for theism (and the contrapositive).  After all, knowing such truths may be a way of entering into a practice that includes other, higher rational beings...

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