The Human Question

Call it strong variationism or strong randomness or strongly random variationism (none of these sound quite right... this is a work in progress). It makes a strong claim about the role of random variation in generating new species. It takes for granted Darwin's understanding of the role of natural selection, as that is not really where the controversy lies. And it allows one to separate the role of variation from controversies about Darwin's opinion regarding divine providence, Lamarkianism (that is, it would seem, on the basis of The Descent of Man , that Darwin himself was willing to attribute a role to use/disuse, now discredited source of variation), racism, eugenics, etc. And it allows us to contrast that with weaker roles that might be given to random variation, again without any unneeded historical baggage.

This point is by Bill Dembski: it's possible that Rubenstein knows nothing about piano yet hits keys randomly right before perfect music plays. His point is to show that if an infininte number of universes get rid of the anthropic principle, it gets rid of a whole lot of other stuff besides (including, I would add, science).

Interesting point by Bill Dembski in The Design Revolution: that Robert Boyle introduced a mechanistic view of the world in order to safeguard theism from the immanent teleology of Aristotelianism, which in his view did not seem as open to the divine. Makes me anxious to reread Timaeus on the nature of nature. Every mechanistic universe needs a non-mechanistic motor: think of gravity for Newton: it is not mechanically caused. Interesting that Aristotle's thoroughly non-mechanistic universe does have some push and pull to it: spheres drive much of the movement that occurs on earth. But the natural movement of the four elements as well as organic activity are not mechanically driven. Most importantly, the spheres while themselves responsibile for pushing a lot of things around, are drawn by love of what is higher. Aristotle may have rejected a lot of what Plato proposed, but when it came to the Good being supreme, he would have agreed with his teacher, albeit while describing ...

Evolution is a kind of movie-like presentation of nature, whereas the observation of chance/purpose/necessity here and now is a kind of snapshot, or maybe a quick videocam shot. Some of those who are schooled in evolution may also be taught that it offers evidence that nature is purposeless, even though they may spontaneously regard the world as purpose-laden when they take a momentary "snapshot" of their present situation. And even though that videocam/snapshot like glimpse of the world in which one lives may well offer one sound reasons to affirm the purposefulness not only of human striving but of the world in which we live, nevertheless, the movie/narrative with the theme that evolution-shows-that-life-has-no-overall-given-meaning can easily trump the camshot of one's lifeworld. I recall what Giussani said about observation and how we must make sure that it is not squelched by ideology. And we must be sensitive to how ideology can be conveyed through a narrative tha...

...to make us able to think of the infinite? Uh, that's intended as a rhetorical question. Thought of the infinite is not more complex than other thought. If you think otherwise, then may I ask you: in order to be of the infinite, must thought itself be infinitely complex? If not consider whether such thought is actually SIMPLER than a lot of thoughts that we and other animals may have in a day. Yet thought of the infinite is qualitatively different, higher, than those other, more complex thoughts. In fact, it is a necessary condition for having a genuinely mathematical thought... as well as any other sort of thematization of what is or may be universally and necessarily true. But let me unpack the above just a little. Consider how math presupposes the ability to think of a kind of infinite. Straight lines in geometry for example, are conceived of as being the same no matter how small you go. The possibility of infinite precision is implicit in the concept of a line. M...

then is a liberal a social Lamarkian? Well, a Marxist definitely is!

How about defining it as an instance of functional complexity? And treating the list of properties as following necessarily from this definition? Okay, this is very diamond-in-the-rough (or perhaps zirconium...) but here goes my thoughts on the matter: (Complexity) Many diverse parts (functional) acting for the sake of the whole I think I need to add something like "not as the instrument of another" or something like that. Given that they act together as one whole and given entropy, etc., the organism will need to posses more order than its surroundings (homeostasis). It will therefore need to take in energy (nutrition), which it will use to sustain its readiness to interact with its environment so as to preserve its own being (homeostasis again?), but which will eventually break down (death), so that in order for that life form to continue it will need to duplicate itself (reproduction), which, upon occurring, will involve both development (growth) to maturity and...

... to acknowledging that our universe is contingent? Matter doesn't have to be this way: in fact, the matter called "our universe" doesn't have to be at all... (see Aquinas's 3rd way for more). And don't the various hypothetical universes have to be individuated in some way? (I dunno, but it seems so). That is, don't they have to have something different about them: otherwise, there would be no explanatory gain in positing them.

He uses the archer analogy: Aquinas would like that! (in fact, I think he does use it in the Summa contra gentiles ). He admits that ID cannot prove classical theism: a Hindu or deist may subscribe to ID. May I add that a polytheist may feel right at home with ID: after all, there's no reason why there can't be as many intelligent sources of design as there are species of organism. He never says that scientific creationism is stupid! I think this is a rhetorical move on his part (he's trying to get them onto his bandwagon): uh, let's call it "rhetorical silence." But doesn't Dembski's make some Darwinians wonder whether Demski is secretly a card carrying creationist? If he is silent on this issue, it's not because of a commitment to saying the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth: it's rather a commitment to persuading someone with whom he does not in fact agree when it comes to the issue of descent with modification. The...

[Sketch of a longer post:] Really, I mean bifocal. Science as we know it is always doing the following two things together (or at least when it is functioning well): looking at nature in terms of analogies with human agency and in terms of what can be quantified. To do just one of these two is to depart from science and, well, to embarrass oneself (and I can't do either of the two, which is even more embarrassing). 1st way of looking at nature: Mathematical p.o.v. nature as placeable within Cartesian coordinates and describable according to quantitative laws of nature. Such descriptions take atom like wholes for granted and ignore final or formal causality. Or rather you might say that they reduce formal = pythagorean shape whatever lawful description can be used, etc. Temptation is to look at material substrate as ultimately being this intert monistic stuff (sorta like pure extension of Descartes) The treat material universe monistically monistic stuff or atom. Replace ...

Behe's argument for intelligent design hinges upon the notion of irreducible complexity found in nature. But if you ask. me (uh, nobody did...), what's more interesting than irreducible complexity is irreducible simplicity: that is, the way in which higher level operations are related to lower level operations. Scientists and philosophers who recognize this irreducibility often refer to it as "emergence." Polanyi discusses it in The Tacit Dimension. Aquinas talks about something quite similar as well (especially when he compares how the sensus communis is related to the proper senses). I'll call this characteristic "emergence" without intended to subscribe to any particular explanation of how these higher level powers arise in the first place. Although Behe doesn't mention emergence, the complexity that he calls "irreducible" has a couple of similarities to emergent properties. Both involve a whole that relies upon its many parts...

Most theories, once regarded as confirmed, become the basis for further studies directed not at reconfirming the original thesis but getting deeper insights. So what would happen if someone managed to confirm one instance of ID: what research program would follow? What deeper insights might one seek? I suppose one could turn to other events in nature and see if they too exhibit ID. One could keep busy dealing with new apparent counter-examples as well. And one would also keep pretty busy answering the never-ending objections of philosophical skeptics (perhaps one of those objections would be that "ID is just a theory...?"). The latter, however, might be a philosophical rather than a strictly scientific enterprise. But none of these controversies would actually move scientific knowledge forward to a new level. The only way in which that might happen would be by trying to discern what the intelligent designer is like. But that seems likely to be a dead end for science, for (as ...

Integral to Dembski's idea of specified complexity (SC) is the notion that something extrinsic to evolution is the source of the specification in how it develops. He compares SC to the message sent by space aliens in the movie "Contact." In that movie, earthbound scientists determine that radio waves originating in from somewhere in our galaxy are actually a signal being sent by space aliens. The scientists determine that these waves are a signal is the fact that they indicate prime numbers in a way that a random occurrence would not. What is interesting to me is the fact that Dembski relies upon an analogy with a sign rather than a machine. Like a machine, signs are produced by an intelligent being for the sake of something beyond themselves. Machines, if you will, have a meaning. Signs, if you will, produce knowledge. But the meaning/knowledge is in both cases something other than the machine/sign itself. Both signs and machines are purposeful or teleological...

What's amazing about evolution is how mutation would enable an animal not simply to behave in a new way, but to judge situations in a new way: that is to judge instinctively that something desirable or undesirable is to engaged in a certain way. When I think of how much more difficult it is to imagine the cause of alteration of judgment, I can see why Darwin gave in to the temptation to resort to the Lamarkian notion of use/disuse to explain how human cognition evolves. To treat evolution merely in behavioral terms is them like robots or near zombies rather than as judging and experiencing animals.

Proponents of intelligent design deny that random variation combined with natural and sexual selection suffices to originate the present diversity of life forms. It seems to them that any adequate explanation must include an intelligent designer. But they differ among themselves about what that intelligent designer must be like and what it has done. Did it engineer the present life forms pretty much as they are now? Creationists will say yes, but not all IDers are creationists. Did it just engineer the first cell and let the rest unfold? Sometimes ID proponents seem to suggest this (e.g., Michael Behe). Must that engineer have been God? Most will deny that the scientific method could demonstrate that God is the cause of a natural phenomenon; others, however, will insist that ID shows that the world was made by no less than God. Opponents of ID seem to have only the latter crowd in mind. They respond that it is all really religion belief in the disguise of science. Obviously I...

In order for there to be science, the same proposition must be known to have been first proposed, later tested, and finally confirmed/or/rejected. In order for these propositions to be recognized as having been the subject of scientific reasoning, they must have been compared by one and the same person. In other words, I can't know know that I am confirming a hypothesis unless I knew it as an initial hypothesis, then as object of experimental testing and finally as an explanation that has been confirmed or denied. In order for the same person to compare the same proposition at different times, the he or she must keep their identity through time. But if reductive materialism were true, then identity through time would be an illusion. In fact, there would be no such thing as even a momentary identity, for the self would be an illusion. But in such case, there would be no such one to compare the initial hypothesis with its confirming evidence. Nor would there be such a thing ...

This from Descent of Man (henceforth DoM). When a dog recognizes another dog a great distance away, it doesn't think of this or that individual, but of dog in general. This example is weak: you might be unable to distinguish whether THIS dog is Fido or Rover, but you are still thinking of THIS dog at this place and time, not of being-a-dog as common to many individuals at different places and times. The latter and not the former constitutes abstract thought. Sorry, Charlie.

http://the-human-question.blogspot.com/2010/10/math-and-reductionism.html

Darwin he believes that different races have different levels of intellectual ability and that for this reason he expects the better adapted races to replace others. He repeatedly contrasts the "civilized" with the "savage" races, and suggests that the former are more evolved. For example, he points out that those from the African continent have a better developed sense of smell and that this characteristic is even more robust in dogs and chimps. More strikingly, he quotes an expert who compares the jaws of various races, and finds that the shorter jaw and late developed molars in Europeans (in comparison with those of Africans) are evidence that they have been less needed as the former have been eating cooked food longer. He also approvingly quotes at length another scientists who contrasts the impulsive Irish with the frugal Scot, noting with regret how the former are more likely to reproduce. In other words, Darwin is a racist... and a Victorian bigot. W...

Dawkins tells us he is a "good reductionist" (each time I hear this expression, I think of Glinda asking Dorothy "Are you good witch or a bad witch?"), and he takes science as helping to demonstrate this truth. On the other hand, he also agrees that ethical reasoning is a genuine form of human rationality, even though we can't derive our ethical principles from science. I will show how his ethics and reductionism collide with each other. But before I do that let me caution that my criticism does not hinge upon human immortality or the existence of God: those are matters for another discussion. Even one who is agnostic about or hostile to those theses will find Dawkins unable to deliver himself from the horns of the following dilemma. First let me set up the premise: Ethical reasoning cannot take place unless you accept your identity through time, for there is no agency without identity. That is, we must use the word "I" and "you" ...

Darwin's definition of religion, as found in The Descent of Man (need to look this up online and copy it here. Can't do that now as I just heard it on audio thanks to vox libri), is so favorable (talks of loving relationship, etc.) that the new atheists would learn a thing or two from Darwin about fair-minded description of religion. No straw-man here.

To propose as RD does that religion is a kind of "bad virus" (memetically speaking, of course) requires that one grant that there could be "good viruses" as well. But such viruses are judged good or bad only in light of how they affect the well-being of the affected organism(s). So in speaking of bad viruses RD is to bring memetics into conflict with his genetics (that is, with SelfishGeneTheory). For according to the latter, everything that an organism does is to be evaluated as if it existed ultimately for the sake of enabling the gene to duplicate itself. When memes, as viruses, are judged as good or bad, however, they are evaluated not on the basis of how they affect the reproductive success of their possessors, but on on the basis of how they affect their possessors' experience well-being. To speak of good and bad viruses, therefore, is to depart from natural science and enter into the realm of ethics. One may object to the above analysis by claiming that...

For a thoroughly selfish gene, mutation is a case of partial (albeit very partial) failure. That is, even though th gene aims at copying itself exactly, it is prevented from doing so either by its own failings or by external interference. Some of these mutations, however, are adaptive, i.e., lead to more reproductive success than they would have had without the mutation. Sticking with the anthropmorphic analogy, you might say that genes undergoing these mutations have dumb luck. One may object to this sort of talk by saying that genes don't aim at anything, so they can't miss or have good luck. To which I would reply, well, then I guess that the metaphor of selfishness is not all that useful or illuminating either.

If SJ Gould's thesis (uh, I think he and another guy first proposed it) of spandrels is a valid scientific claim, then it can be tested. The alternate hypothesis, I propose, is over-engineering (that is, in spite of my thumbing my nose at ID, today, Saturday, Oct. 16, 2010, I am taking it seriously). Why are the humans who belong to tribes that only count up to 4 able to math as well as others (when given an education)? Why is there a Mozart, Einstein? They have cognitive abilities that are over and above what would be needed to survive and thrive in an imagined prehistoric scenario, so why is that so? Sexual selection? Were brainy guys babe-magnets compared to the jocks way back when? Gould's answer is that these amazing abilities are the result of the convergence of two different survival-relevant characteristics. They are like the spandrels in buildings. Not structurally relevant, but very ornate. But, as I pointed out waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaay back, when I first started this b...

If it is to be based upon analogy with genetics, then where is the analog of sexual reproduction? memetics: the new phrenology Why is it that the most enthusiastic proponents of this pseudo theory go onto to excoriate ID for being a pseudo theory?

In a debate with Alister McGrath, Dennet proposes that, far from being beneficial to humans, religion is a virus to which we adapt. It occurs to me that Dennet, like Dawkins recognizes that religion is part of the human condition but doesn't want to grant that it is beneficial. But if one can argue that religion is a virus, can't someone else argue that democracy is one as well? At which point, we need to drop meme talk and rely on an insightful discussion of the evidence for/against belief in God.

If I were to try to explain the origin of theism as naturalistically as possible, my starting point would not be trying to explain causes of natural phenomena (which D'Souza points out, is an anachronistic reading of history) but look at something like the communion of the saints as natural to human society. And that communion, as a community, has a leader: the Holy One. This theme is not utterly independent of seeking causes of nature. But an adequate explanation must include both. By "natural" I don't mean "non-supernatural," for nature itself points to God. Especially human nature: if there is freedom, then there is more to nature than an ontological-naturalist (as in anti-supernatralist) is willing to recognize; and there is more to nature than a methodological-naturalist (that is, one who as a matter of principle, when doing science admits only of materialistic explanations) is able to recognize.

The discussion below is a response to S J Gould's comparison of evolution with a drunk man walking. The latter eventually walks in the gutter/groove in the road, not because he was aiming for it, but because it serves as a kind of guide, etc. No teleology, just coincidence and good fit. Something similar happens with attaining higher and higher levels of complexity. Once each level fits, we stick with it. Organisms don't aim to become more complex. It just happens. My reply is an analogy Suppose I leave a raccoon trap outside my house and a week later it catches a raccoon. It would be correct to say that the trap caught a raccoon on purpose. But if we consider the fact that many different raccoons were in the vicinity of the trap, some of them came very near to it, a few touched it, but only one took the bait, we can say that it was by chance that I caught this raccoon at this time. We can say the same about planting an IED on the road. In both cases, the very sam...

I just remembered an interesting and problematic passage in RD's most recent work, The Greatest Show on Earth . I'll note it here and get back to it later to see if this scientifically misleading statement by Dawkins is worth examining in more detail. It has to do with the doctrine--originating with Ernest Haeckel-- that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (that's a fancy way of saying that the development of an individual organism replays the phases of evolution of that organism's species). This doctrine has long since been disproven. In fact, one would propose a robust version of this claim only if one were a Lamarkian. But Dawkins "says it without saying it" in The Greatest Show on Earth , when he quotes JBS Haldane's comeback to a woman who objected to evolution, by pointing out that she, in her embryological development did the same (paraphrasing): "But my dear, you did that yourself!" A witty riposte indeed--but not good science. He a...

It is inherently cartbeforethehorse-ish to talk/debate about free will prior to considering what it is to wish for an end . That is because wishing is presupposed by and inherent to choosing while choosing is partially constituted by wishing. By "wish" I mean to desire a specific kind of good. For example, to want to be healthy. The infinitive form indicates that there is something beyond the here and now about health as an object of desire. You want it for yourself, but not for a determine period: rather any time is a good time to be healthy. Note also that wishing to be healthy presupposes cognition of the object of desire, and cognition of healthy as such is already to transcend local time and place. More on that later. One who denies free will cannot deny wishing occurs. But wishing already offers evidence sufficient to overturn materialism. Also, prior to studying wishing and choosing, it is necessary to study the appetitive activity of animals lower than h...

Given that brains change structure when our opinions change, the question of how the two are related to each other naturally arises. We can pose that question in the same manner that Socrates once did to Euthyphro. Just as Socrates asked, is something good because the gods say it is, or do the gods say it is because it is good? And just as that question allowed for four answers (the first, the second, both, neither) so to does the following: Does the opinion change because of the change in brain structure, or does the structure change because of the change in opinion? Or are both alternatives partially true? Or are both entirely false? So the four alternatives are as follows: 1. opinion changes because of change in brain structure; 2. brain structure changes because of change in opinion; 3. both influence each other; 4. neither influences the other because the two are identical. It is easy to guess at how an epiphenomenalist would answer (1), as well as how a dualist would (2)....

Dennet argues that Searle's Chinese Room Argument is not cogent if you consider the possibility that the circuitry/machinery/personnel in the Chinese room could be many times (billions?) more complicated that Searle's example considers. Let us grant the complexity at whatever level that Dennet requires. Then let us add the following stipulation: that none of the components (be they non-electrical devices, super-computers, or persons) inside the Chinese room operates simultaneously with any of the other ones (this would take the equivalent of a sustain pedal on a guitar). It may take decades for it to perform ONE sentential act, but it gives the same answer as it would if they all operated in parallel, etc. Would this combination of asynchronously operating components be a thinking machine?

The following discussion assumes that there is such a thing as an evolutionary dead-end. Or better, a cuddle-de-sac (the two words are synonymous in their literal meaning, but "dead end" seems to suggest that you must stop, whereas "cuddle-de-sac" suggests that you can turn around). That is, some life forms are much less likely to form a more complex, higher life forms than others. The discussion also assumes that we can imagine many different ways in which different kinds of primal life forms could have arisen. Only one of these ways would be dna as we know it now. It assumes that given the laws of chemistry and the conditions, there are many ways biogenesis could have occurred... many ways of duplicating a dna like code as well as read it to form proteins. Here is question #1 (I can only ask, not answer this question, so it ain't much of a discussion): Are there many ways that the first cell could have structured? Would all of those ways have led ...

This in response to his claim that our universe is the result of a fluctuation in a quantum field, and that this dispenses with the need for a Creator. Question: can this field also go out of existence? [did SH say quantum field or quantum law?] (A) If no, then quantum field is a necessary being. In that case, I will argue, the quantum field will exist always and everywhere, that is, in every possible universe. Let me demonstrate (or try to demonstrate) that point by indirect argument. Suppose the quantum field simply must exist but it exists in some universes and not in others. If I ask Hawking can give no answer. For as the points out, the field is prior to matter. So there is no difference in the "environment" inhabited as it were by diverse quantum fields. To put it in scholastic language, there is no matter to individuate this (quasi-) form called the quantum field. So it is either everywhere (that is, in every possible universe) or individuated. Next pre...

Hi Tim, I am posting my reply here, because the great blogmeister won't let me put it all in a comment. Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift). My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason. The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His han...

Maybe this analogy works, I dunno: for a situation in which energeia and kinesis are interwoven, energeia is related to kinesis as is the act of listening-to-what-another-is-saying is to the hearing of individual sounds... and this is like what Polanyi has to say about higher and lower levels in his chapter on emergence in the Tacit Dimension (new word alert: demention?)

If someone were to ask the above-mentioned question, I'd point out that we value our ability to reason (broadly understood) abilities that seem more basic and which may make reason possible. In this way we are a microcosm of the universe So just as we value one aspect of ourselves over others, so too do we regard some parts of the universe over others. The highest part can do whatever the lower does... plus more.

My reply would be to ask, if you were brought up in a monarchy before democracy or even Parliament existed would you believe it was natural for countries to be ruled by kings? If so, then is that fact evidence against the claim that democracy is better? If so, then if you were brought up in a fascist regime and had only knowledge of that sort of society, would you believe that sort of government is natural and fitting? Is that fact evidence against the claim that democracy is better?

Doesn't reductionism require a combination of naivete and presumption? Naivete about the lower level entities to which one reduces the higher level: one employes common sense notions of the nano entity being a whole of a certain kind and of it acting in accordance with the kind of thing that it is... an assumption similar to that which we make in our everyday practices, with the exception being that these nano entities have exotic and paradoxical combinations of characteristics. Presumption inasmuch as one assumes that a glimpse of the nano-technology, as it were, of life, suffices over-turn the common sense notions of part and whole through a Copernican revolution. I object to this presumption, for its seems arguable that every theory relies upon common sense: if we overturned ALL of common sense in one fell swoop, science would disappear entirely, like the snake swallowing its tail. It is more reasonable, in my opinion, for the scientist to think of themself as clarifying ...

In a discussion on Unbelievable?, she stated that there is no such thing as a self: just a collection of cells or atoms (so said she in a friendly debate with Charles Foster). She also let it be known that she belongs to a humanist society (don't know the exact name). My thought on that: it seems rather hard to be a humanist when you don't believe that human beings really exist. Further point: how can we possess mathematical and scientific truths if these truths themselves have an identity and we don't? Is there one neuron that possesses one truth and another that possesses another? Do they share truths with each other? Or does one neuron possess one part of one truth and another neuron possess another part of the other truth? And if many neurons somehow work together to possess a truth and the neurons themselves constantly undergo change, how is it that the truth itself doesn't change slightly? She criticizes the notion that there is an individual within us...

Back to the very worthwhile thing that Pinker points out about the corpus callossum: that when the brain is divided there one can be "of two minds" (my pun, not his) and one side seems to rationalize the behavior of the other. It has been quite a while, so I don't remember any more details, but the following big-picture point came to me the other day. First of all, I need to review the passage in Pinker's book to figure out whether he is incorrectly interpreting the data. But let's set that aside for the moment. Pointing out this problem does not suffice to disprove the unity (and hence the existence) of the soul. For it leaves unexplained how even half of the human brain could act in a unified fashion... as more than just the sum of its parts. Even half a brain is all one needs to show that reductionism is absurd.

This post is a response to an interesting debate between Joanna Collicutt McGrath and Martyn Frame on Unbelievable? -- a debate regarding the claim that humans have evolved "agency detection" (AD) and that AD is responsible for our belief in God, so that belief in God is therefore without a rational basis: Before my criticism of the use of AD to defeat theism, first a criticism of a premise of that just sketched argument: the premise that use a "theory of mind (TOM) " to infer the existence of other agents in the world about us. TOM is integral to Frame's argument, as it characterizes reasoning that leads to God as something like a conjecture about a hidden cause of phenomena... a conjecture for which he finds no adequate warrant. Now my criticism of TOM: it is ultimately agnostic about the existence of other minds in the way a Popperian is agnostic about the truth of any scientific theory. TOM language strongly suggests that a human being first reaso...

Intelligent design is not the only alternative to random variation. The other alternative is a genus, non-random. ID is a species of non-random explanations, one that can be further divided into first-cell ID, creationist ID (start off with more than one life form), and stages ID (that is, a series of miracles guide evolution). The other species within the genus of non-random evolution is teleological evolution that does not admit of mechanistic explanation (ID is essentially a theory about biochemical mechanics). The other major species can be divided in to different species (all of which may be dubious, but that's another question). Those species include the already discredit Lamarkian explanation of evolution, which is that use modifies inheritance. Another would be more gene savy, but deny that mutation proceeds like, as Gould said in Full House, a drunk man walking... Instead, the telos of the first life form was the human. A kind of unconscious force, as it were. Now ...

I am not on the ID bandwagon, but when someone like RD says that the teaching of it is harmful to the education of children, I am tempted to change the subject just a little and point out that RD does at least as much damage with his announcing that science undermines belief in God. For doing so makes science into something that it is not. It makes science look like a threat to theism when it is not, and that certainly does not motivate parents to promote the study of science. When talking about what science teaches us, he should stick to the sorts of facts that can be established through research in scientific journals.

This post will only make sense to me for a week or two, because Ari's defiinition of motion is so difficult: motion, says Aristotle, is the the entelechy of a potency as such. To understand this definition, I propose to offer my own version thereof, while borrowing (more accurately, stealing) a little from Joe Sachs, and while also doing something that neither he nor Aristotle does, which is to place motion within the genus "change." This genus includes not only qualitative, quantitative and locational change (all of which belong to the species "motion"), but substantial change as well, which is not a motion b/c the substantial change is not the traversal of a continuum. "Not ... a continuum" is appropriate here because the change from non-human to human doesn't involve a transition from, say, 1% human to 2%... to 99% to fully human). So let's see if my paraphrase of Aristotle succeeds: motion is a change (1) that is incomplete (2) 1. [the g...

Benjamin Wiker (author of The Darwin Myth ) points out (while being interviewed by Ian Maxfield for the Podcast "The Catholic Laboratory") that Darwin's states in his Descent of Man that humanity consists of different races and (adds approvingly) that certain races will eventually wipe out other races (I may have overstated Wiker's own paraphrase). This is interesting because , first of all, Dawkins fails to mention this in The Greatest Show , as does Pinker in The Blank Slate. The latter criticizes the feminist rejection of evolutionary psychology, saying that they commit the (so-called) naturalistic fallacy (roughly, basing ought on is), and recommends both that we embrace both evo/psych and promote liberal social and political norms . But if we reject the basing of morals on insights into the way our emotions/values have developed, then what would be the basis upon which we would justify our notions of equality and the like? If Pinker encountered a very well...

It would be interesting to know if scientists have developed a complex algorithm for taking cranial dimensions and translating them into bodily characteristics. Interesting because I have learned (and forgotten) a few basic patterns of relations between the two (for example, the type of teeth a primate has indicates a lot about how that primate lives, eats, as well as its dimensions). If there is no such algorithm, then I would like to do the following test. Give a skull (even a fictional one) and have two or more different scientists generate pictures of the complete animals. Q.: how much would their pictures vary?

Back to the accusation that it's infantile to long for eternal happiness... First question: What does an infant enjoy that adults don't? One can imagine that infants enjoy a conflict free unconditional love of the other who takes care of all of their needs. It is worth pointing out, however, that life as an infant is in no way conflict-free or pure bliss. Not at all: not even from day one. But infants typically enjoy least periods of carefree union and bliss. If one grants that humans can remember their infancy, or it least what it felt like during their infancy, then there is room for the objection that the desire to unending bliss is nothing other than the desire to return to one's infancy. But that is not the only possible source of the desire for bliss. For adults have a much better memory of their adulthood than their infancy (in fact, the latter is non-existent). And a good part of the adult population are able to enjoy or at least imagine what it's like to e...

It is noteworthy that LaPlace, inspired by Newtonian physics, got rid of both divine Providence and human freedom. Something similar can be said about Freud: he considered belief in a provident God a delusion, and regarded human freedom more or less in the same way. So divine freedom (as manifest in divine Providence) and human freedom go (and come) together: this is worth investigating more.

Are there reasons why some might wish that there is no God? Certainly, if there are if one sees belief in God as cramping one's lifestyle for one reason or another. The desire to live a more satisfactory lifestyle may (mistakenly) motivate one to presume that atheism is correct or to adopt atheism when the arguments for it are weak or to look only into arguments for atheism and neglect to look into arguments for theism. That said, the fact that some may adopt atheism simply because they find it more comforting to despair of God's existence does not prove that atheism is false--not any more than the fact that some adopt theism because of the comfort that its hope offers. But it's worth pointing out that wish fulfillment is a two-way street.

If one says that it doesn't, then wouldn't one have to explain why the universe is different from other wholes; otherwise one will be guilty of special pleading. .. [Tim, what do you think? ]

In order to test for their existence, one would have to show that laws describing the behavior of components do not suffice, when combined, to account for the behavior of the whole. As in sub-atomic particles/atom; chemicals/bodily activity. What's really interesting is to consider how one could test in the domain of biochemistry. Careful also to avoid positing a special force alongside of the other forces (vitalism). Instead of vitalism, refer to Polanyi's heirarchical conception of things of levels of being. To dogmatise that there are no emergent properties would require one to say that all particles are conscious. For one would have to claim that what seems to have emerged in fact was already there. Monads, anyone?

The hypothesis that we act naturally so as to preserve genotype is very consistent with the data. For example, the way men are more likely to be attracted to many partners and women more likely to just one... and other ways as well that escape my mind... but lots of them are so-called altruistic behaviors. RD distinguishes between the motivation we're aware of and the past processes that explain the origin of that motivation. Good point. But I'm afraid some folks don't keep this distinction in mind when they talk as if evolutionary advantage (what I call genotype preservation) explained everything. It is a mistake to take as demonstrated the claim that the behaviors in question are genuinely explained by genotype preservation. In fact, in order for it to be a scientific theory, one has to put forward an experiment with a predication of some sort (a retrodiction will do). Not seeking to disprove utterly this hypothesis, and not being a scientist, I propose the follo...

In his book on immortality, Dinesh makes a very savy response to the claim that the desire for life after death is mere wish fulfillment. He points out that belief in life after death is found in all cultures--even in societies that expect the next life to be quite dreary. So, carrying the ball where my reading of/listening to/ him left off (he might make this point later on), I would ask why even such societies posit life after death? What is it in human nature that makes it so natural to think this way? It cannot be merely desire if the next life is not depicted as all that desirable. Also, I would point out that those who believe the human brain is a computer talk about downloading a program for your brain and thereby enabling you to continue living after apparent bodily death... apparently this sort of wish fulfillment is okay, as long as you have made science your religion.

Has science been invoked in an unsound manner in the past in order to beat theism or go against theistic morals and ontology? It would be good to make an historical survey and then relate it to modern day fads. Some of Freud's claims qualify: the Oedipus complex, for example, is not common to all cultures. The best example might be the steady state theory, which asserted that matter comes into existence out of nowhere in order to avoid admitting that the universe has a beginning. The positing of the multiverse seems to be motivated by the same reluctance to grant that divine providence is evidenced by the fine tuning of our universe. Margaret Mead's weak but well publicized work in .... Samoa? might be another good example. Perhaps the Miller-Yuri experiment?

To the proposal of eternal life with the loving Father the Freudian atheist objects with the ad hominem sounding retort that it is to wish to return to infantile bliss. To that objection, one might reply: surely this is a scientifically testable thesis, so how would you test it? I have an idea: look for someone who surely did not experience infantile bliss yet does wish to experience eternal life in union with the loving Father. If the Freudian atheist is correct, then no such person exists, for the only plausible cause of such a wish is the memory of having experienced something like it in the past. Has this experiment been conducted? No? If not, then why does the Freudian atheist pontificate so confidently? What would happen if we found an individual who most definitely did not experience anything like infantile bliss yet desires eternal happiness. Would the Freudian, ala Popper, simply admit that their (as in "her" or "his") claim was false? No, the...

New atheists tend to present unsophisticated versions of religious belief for comparison/critique. To manifest the unfairness of this, it would be good to compare with similarly unsophisticated versions of science. For example, thinking of the atom as a mini solar system with lots of absolutely empty space as a foil to the belief in solids... to portray the atom thus is to get carried away with your initial image/model of nature, to import too much from the original analog (or perhaps not enough, since the gravity between sun and planets is not exactly nothing). Something like that definitely happens with religion...my point is that there is a childish or crude way of thinking about scientific claims, and that the childish/crude way of thinking about God should be compared, not to the more thoughtful version of science, but to its appropriate correlate in scientific thinking.