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a destructive dilemma for Steven Hawking

This in response to his claim that our universe is the result of a fluctuation in a quantum field, and that this dispenses with the need for a Creator.

Question: can this field also go out of existence? [did SH say quantum field or quantum law?]

(A) If no, then quantum field is a necessary being. In that case, I will argue, the quantum field will exist always and everywhere, that is, in every possible universe.

Let me demonstrate (or try to demonstrate) that point by indirect argument. Suppose the quantum field simply must exist but it exists in some universes and not in others. If I ask Hawking can give no answer. For as the points out, the field is prior to matter. So there is no difference in the "environment" inhabited as it were by diverse quantum fields. To put it in scholastic language, there is no matter to individuate this (quasi-) form called the quantum field. So it is either everywhere (that is, in every possible universe) or individuated.

Next premise in my argument is that IF the quantum field is a necessary being AND (just established-->) it doesn't vary from universe to universe, then neither do the laws of nature. This argument assumes that these laws are a function of quantum field.

In that case, there will not be a multiplicity of universes with diverse laws of nature. It will follow that there is no "lottery" that would make it likely that some universes are not life friendly while many are not. One will not be able to argue that our universe is life-friendly simply because we won the lottery. Instead it will seem that the multi-verse is as finely tuned as our universe.

(B) 2nd horn: If yes (that is, our universe's quantum field is capable of going out of existence), then wouldn't the same be true for all universes? And given an infinite amount of time, wouldn't all quantum fields go out of existence? In such a case, wouldn't it be impossible for any matter to come into existence? And if the multi-verse is eternal, wouldn't it be extremely highly probable that every universe has already gone out of existence. In that case, nothing would exist right now.

But since things DO exist right now, it is evident that (B) the second horn of this dilemma cannot be true.

But that leads to the following destructive dilemma If (H) Hawking is correct, then (AvB) A or B is true; but (~A*~B) both A and B are false; therefore (~H) Hawking is incorrect.
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Comments

Tim D said…
FYI - it's Hawking, not Hawkins
9:09 AM
Leo White said…
oopsies! Will correct.
9:48 AM
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