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What Dembski says is interesting, but some of the things he doesn't say are even more interesting

He uses the archer analogy: Aquinas would like that! (in fact, I think he does use it in the Summa contra gentiles).

He admits that ID cannot prove classical theism: a Hindu or deist may subscribe to ID. May I add that a polytheist may feel right at home with ID: after all, there's no reason why there can't be as many intelligent sources of design as there are species of organism.

He never says that scientific creationism is stupid! I think this is a rhetorical move on his part (he's trying to get them onto his bandwagon): uh, let's call it "rhetorical silence." But doesn't Dembski's make some Darwinians wonder whether Demski is secretly a card carrying creationist?

If he is silent on this issue, it's not because of a commitment to saying the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth: it's rather a commitment to persuading someone with whom he does not in fact agree when it comes to the issue of descent with modification. The question remaining is, then, is he a creationist trying to woo the evolutionists, or an evolutionist trying to woo the creationists?


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Leo White said…
I should add to the subject line "--and disturbing"
9:48 AM
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