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The first cell and fine tuning

The following discussion assumes that there is such a thing as an evolutionary dead-end. Or better, a cuddle-de-sac (the two words are synonymous in their literal meaning, but "dead end" seems to suggest that you must stop, whereas "cuddle-de-sac" suggests that you can turn around). That is, some life forms are much less likely to form a more complex, higher life forms than others.

The discussion also assumes that we can imagine many different ways in which different kinds of primal life forms could have arisen. Only one of these ways would be dna as we know it now. It assumes that given the laws of chemistry and the conditions, there are many ways biogenesis could have occurred... many ways of duplicating a dna like code as well as read it to form proteins.

Here is question #1 (I can only ask, not answer this question, so it ain't much of a discussion): Are there many ways that the first cell could have structured? Would all of those ways have led to evolution, especially the evolution of animals with the sort of neural complexity (cortex, and in humans, neocortex) found in mammals? When we compare the probability of this sort of life form developing in comparison with the other "non-mammalable" or " forms, is there a 50/50 chance of the mammalable form or far less than 50%?

#2 What IF the cortex-friendly-Dna forms are highly improbable in comparison with the other biogenesis scenarios? ("IF" is such a big, big word): do we have a case of fine tuning here? (no need to commit as to whether a space alien, demi-god, angel or infiinitely transcendent being is the tuner)

That is, I think, the relevant question for a protozoic version of the fine tuning argument.

Question #2: if many of these are equally probable, then why does only one exist now? Did the DnaAsWeKnowIt organisms beat out the others?
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Comments

Unknown said…
The probability may very well be greater than 50%. Each evolutionary step is dependent on the last, and so the intermediate probabilities are independent, and not just multiplied. Imagine running the Game of Life for billions of years. In just a few minutes, it can make little things that reproduce.
8:01 AM
Leo White said…
Okay, I guess I gotta read that Game of Life thing... then I'll call you up to have you translate.
9:21 AM
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