In a debate with Alister McGrath, Dennet proposes that, far from being beneficial to humans, religion is a virus to which we adapt. It occurs to me that Dennet, like Dawkins recognizes that religion is part of the human condition but doesn't want to grant that it is beneficial. But if one can argue that religion is a virus, can't someone else argue that democracy is one as well? At which point, we need to drop meme talk and rely on an insightful discussion of the evidence for/against belief in God.
This is a nice way to try to avoid being cornered re the irreality of the self if you're a reductionist, for you can assert that a pattern obtains at the microscopic level that is not all that unlike the pattern found at the societal level. No need for the one self that does it all: instead, you have many sub-selfs that compete for dominance or take turns guiding the whole. The problem with this is, however, that the voters/officials are all zombies. None of them thinks about the whole as such. And perhaps none of them thinks even about themselves (unless one is a panzoist). None of them makes a comparison of alternatives. The more this proposed democracy seems like a zombocracy, the more consciousness will be seem to be epiphenomenal. Furthermore, if the oneness of the self is less real than the multiplicity of explanatory neural parts, then why can't each of these neural parts be conceived of as democracy as well? And why not parts of these parts, et...
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