Destructive dilemma for Dawkins

Dawkins tells us he is a "good reductionist" (each time I hear this expression, I think of Glinda asking Dorothy "Are you good witch or a bad witch?"), and he takes science as helping to demonstrate this truth. On the other hand, he also agrees that ethical reasoning is a genuine form of human rationality, even though we can't derive our ethical principles from science.

I will show how his ethics and reductionism collide with each other. But before I do that let me caution that my criticism does not hinge upon human immortality or the existence of God: those are matters for another discussion. Even one who is agnostic about or hostile to those theses will find Dawkins unable to deliver himself from the horns of the following dilemma.

First let me set up the premise:

Ethical reasoning cannot take place unless you accept your identity through time, for there is no agency without identity. That is, we must use the word "I" and "you" and "we" to wish, deliberate, choose, and execute. You can claim all you want that there is no such thing as a self, as an I or you, but as soon as you try to reason about how to act, you will be quite convinced that you need to do something.

This leaves us with two alternatives: ethical thinking is either dualistic or delusional.

1. Dualistic: the "I" of practical reasoning is real. But since it cannot be measured or observed using the scientific method, there must be another, metaphysical sort of reality, one that transcends the gaze of the scientific method.

2. Delusional: there is no "I": it is a fiction, a delusion, an untruth, but an unavoidable one (and since we cannot live with materialism, it is existentially worthless).

In either case, Dawkins' take on reality is internally inconsistent.

Caveat: while this dilemma is unavoidable for Dawkins, it does not necessarily arise if you reject reductive materialism. This cavelat would be even more credible if I offered a cogent argument for an alternative understanding of how science and ethics are related. I intend to do that. For the moment, however, I will point out that even if you think that materialism and dualism are the only two options available, you will have two grant that this dilemma undercuts Dawkin's understanding of reality, as well as that of any reductive materialist.

Addendum: Massimo and Tim sent me clarifications, which I am posting below:

T: a quantum field one one hand and matter on the other are not mutually exclusive entities. Every particle is also a wave, whether or not the particle is matter or energy. In quantum field theory, where quantum mechanics is consistently merged with special relativity (but not general relativity), the "wave" gets extended to become a "field", but still everything, matter and energy, is a "field" fundamentally.

M: matter is a byproduct of the fields; as the universe expands and cools down, the fields "decay" in that particularsoth of thing we call matter. Both dark matter and regular "barionic" matter are basically made in this way, at different times immediately after the big-bang.

P F Strawson's Freedom and Resentment: the argument laid out

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response to friend who suggested that the self is a democracy of neural parts

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