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Dawkins recapitulates a fallacy

I just remembered an interesting and problematic passage in RD's most recent work, The Greatest Show on Earth . I'll note it here and get back to it later to see if this scientifically misleading statement by Dawkins is worth examining in more detail.

It has to do with the doctrine--originating with Ernest Haeckel-- that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (that's a fancy way of saying that the development of an individual organism replays the phases of evolution of that organism's species). This doctrine has long since been disproven. In fact, one would propose a robust version of this claim only if one were a Lamarkian. But Dawkins "says it without saying it" in The Greatest Show on Earth, when he quotes JBS Haldane's comeback to a woman who objected to evolution, by pointing out that she, in her embryological development did the same (paraphrasing): "But my dear, you did that yourself!" A witty riposte indeed--but not good science.

He also discusses how human embryos have something like gills at a certain stage of development. The interesting question is how there be some truth to this description AND at the same time the claim that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny is no longer regarded as good science.

It's worth going back to that passage in Show to see how it fits into his overall argument.
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