Skip to main content

Who are you to say humans are of more value than other animals?

If someone were to ask the above-mentioned question, I'd point out that we value our ability to reason (broadly understood) abilities that seem more basic and which may make reason possible. In this way we are a microcosm of the universe So just as we value one aspect of ourselves over others, so too do we regard some parts of the universe over others. The highest part can do whatever the lower does... plus more.

Comments

Unknown said…
Interesting argument. My first answer would be that humans name (name is a verb here - we give names to things and to events). You can't really see reason from the outside. An alien coming to earth wouldn't instantly perceive that primitive man was reasoning. What the alien would instantly perceive is that the humans talk a lot. That sound patterns in relation to external objects spontaneously come out of them. Chimps don't even do this spontaneously - they have to be taught. (They can say "ouch" with sign language, but they can't name.)
Leo White said…
Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift).

My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason.

The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His hands" of God; one might also say, "He's got the whole world in his mind." So there's a sense that in order for "my world" to make sense, so does yours: yours has to make sense too, because we all live in the same world (the "we" being all rational creatures).

Oh well, that's just a sketch, but here's some background.

As I composed this argument, I had in the back of my mind something a French Catholic philosopher named Jacques Maritain pointed out in The Person and the Common Good: that there is a kind of infinity to the human person. It's as if we take the whole cosmos w/n our thought. Add to that what some Rennaissance dude said about man as microcosm, and its almost as if we model, in our governance of our bodily movements, the divine governance.

Naming is part of this god-like way we imitate divine providence. For naming is disinguising forms of being in terms of their purpose, which purpose is related to the purpose of the whole, which whole can be thematized by us humans and not by chimps.

Oh well, that's my story an' I'm stickin' to it :)
Leo White said…
Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift).

My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason.

The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His hands" of God; one might also say, "He's got the whole world in his mind." So there's a sense that in order for "my world" to make sense, so does yours: yours has to make sense too, because we all live in the same world (the "we" being all rational creatures).

Oh well, that's just a sketch, but here's some background.

As I composed this argument, I had in the back of my mind something a French Catholic philosopher named Jacques Maritain pointed out in The Person and the Common Good: that there is a kind of infinity to the human person. It's as if we take the whole cosmos w/n our thought. Add to that what some Rennaissance dude said about man as microcosm, and its almost as if we model, in our governance of our bodily movements, the divine governance.

Naming is part of this god-like way we imitate divine providence. For naming is disinguising forms of being in terms of their purpose, which purpose is related to the purpose of the whole, which whole can be thematized by us humans and not by chimps.

Oh well, that's my story an' I'm stickin' to it :)
Leo White said…
Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift).

My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason.

I tried to post more in the comments, but google wouldn't let me, so I'm creating a new link...

Popular posts from this blog

P F Strawson's Freedom and Resentment: the argument laid out

Here is a summary and comments on the essay Freedom and Resentment by PF Strawson.  He makes some great points, and when he is wrong, it is in such a way as to clarify things a great deal.  My non-deterministic position is much better thanks to having read this.  I’ll summarize it in this post and respond in a later one. In a nutshell: PFS first argues that personal resentment that we may feel toward another for having failed to show goodwill toward us would have no problem coexisting with the conviction that determinism is true.  Moral disapprobation, as an analog to resentment, is likewise capable of coexisting with deterministic convictions. In fact, it would seem nearly impossible for a normally-constituted person (i.e., a non-sociopath) to leave behind the web of moral convictions, even if that person is a determinist.  In this way, by arguing that moral and determinist convictions can coexist in the same person, PFS undermines the libertarian argument ...

response to friend who suggested that the self is a democracy of neural parts

This is a nice way to try to avoid being cornered re the irreality of the self if you're a reductionist, for you can assert that a pattern obtains at the microscopic level that is not all that unlike the pattern found at the societal level.  No need for the one self that does it all: instead, you have many sub-selfs that compete for dominance or take turns guiding the whole. The problem with this is, however, that the voters/officials are all zombies.  None of them thinks about the whole as such.  And perhaps none of them thinks even about themselves (unless one is a panzoist).  None of them makes a comparison of alternatives. The more this proposed democracy seems like a zombocracy, the more consciousness will be seem to be epiphenomenal. Furthermore, if the oneness of the self is less real than the multiplicity of explanatory neural parts, then why can't each of these neural parts be conceived of as democracy as well?  And why not parts of these parts, et...

interesting article by Jimmy Akin on death before the Fall

http://www.ncregister.com/blog/jimmy-akin/did-animals-die-before-the-fall/ Akin below: Aquinas.... writes: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on Genesis 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals  [ Summa Theologiae I:96:1 ad 2 ].  Aquinas thus holds that it was not  all  death that entered the world through man's sin, but human  death.