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Steven Pinker on the corpus callosum

Back to the very worthwhile thing that Pinker points out about the corpus callossum: that when the brain is divided there one can be "of two minds" (my pun, not his) and one side seems to rationalize the behavior of the other. It has been quite a while, so I don't remember any more details, but the following big-picture point came to me the other day.

First of all, I need to review the passage in Pinker's book to figure out whether he is incorrectly interpreting the data. But let's set that aside for the moment.

Pointing out this problem does not suffice to disprove the unity (and hence the existence) of the soul. For it leaves unexplained how even half of the human brain could act in a unified fashion... as more than just the sum of its parts. Even half a brain is all one needs to show that reductionism is absurd.
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