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It's the phenotype we love, not the genotype

The hypothesis that we act naturally so as to preserve genotype is very consistent with the data. For example, the way men are more likely to be attracted to many partners and women more likely to just one... and other ways as well that escape my mind... but lots of them are so-called altruistic behaviors.

RD distinguishes between the motivation we're aware of and the past processes that explain the origin of that motivation. Good point. But I'm afraid some folks don't keep this distinction in mind when they talk as if evolutionary advantage (what I call genotype preservation) explained everything. It is a mistake to take as demonstrated the claim that the behaviors in question are genuinely explained by genotype preservation.

In fact, in order for it to be a scientific theory, one has to put forward an experiment with a predication of some sort (a retrodiction will do).

Not seeking to disprove utterly this hypothesis, and not being a scientist, I propose the following thought-experiments so as to marginalize the role of genotype preservation.

If you spent time with both an alien that did not at all look human and in fact had an entirely different dna-like substructure, but was capable of very meaningful and pleasant communication with you and also spent time with a bonobo... if after having spent time with both you found yourself in a situation in which you had to choose to save the life of one and let the other be destroyed (think sci-fi here), then which would you choose? [I stipulate that neither would offer you a greater likelihood of survival]. What if you were going to spend years just with one of these two? Replace bonobo with dog in the example. Then cat. Then bird. Then flower. Then cactus.

On the hypothesis that dna match alone explains our positive behavior toward others, you would HAVE to chose the mundane organism each time. But on the hypothesis that our selection is based on cognitive aspects not reducible to gene selection, you would choose the organism most able to interact in a distinctively rational manner.

To assert that a kind of unconscious genotype preservation explains our behavior without considering alternative explanations, such as motivations about which we are completely aware), is to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent:

if genotype preservation is at work, then so and so will act altruistically (or other behavior)
people do act in the manner described in the consequent,
Therefore genotype preservation explains it all.

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