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more than one alternative to randomness

Intelligent design is not the only alternative to random variation. The other alternative is a genus, non-random. ID is a species of non-random explanations, one that can be further divided into first-cell ID, creationist ID (start off with more than one life form), and stages ID (that is, a series of miracles guide evolution). The other species within the genus of non-random evolution is teleological evolution that does not admit of mechanistic explanation (ID is essentially a theory about biochemical mechanics). The other major species can be divided in to different species (all of which may be dubious, but that's another question). Those species include the already discredit Lamarkian explanation of evolution, which is that use modifies inheritance. Another would be more gene savy, but deny that mutation proceeds like, as Gould said in Full House, a drunk man walking... Instead, the telos of the first life form was the human. A kind of unconscious force, as it were. Now some of the options I list may well be without support. My point is that one cannot reason using the following false disjunctive: either random or ID is true, random variation is not sufficient to explain present life forms; therefore ID is true.

One still has to reason about teleology. And that may point to God, not just to an engineer that might be a demi-god. But it may be the case that teleology pointed to God even without bringing up ID. In such a case ID would be superfluous.

***
Looking at this post a long time later, I am not sure that I broke down the question all that well.  "Random" in "random variation" means random only in a qualified sense: with respect to the benefit of the bearer of the phenotype.

On the basis of that definition, any factor that would make genetic change more likely to be beneficial than not would be non-random.  And if that factor were itself engineered or miraculously imposed, then it would be teleological in a sense that immediately points to a personal being that desires life on earth to develop in a certain way.  But if that factor were part of nature acting as it does necessarily or for the most part, then there is a teleology in nature itself... which leads us to God via the fourth way.  In other words, necessity doesn't replace teleology, nor does randomness.
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