If someone were to ask the above-mentioned question, I'd point out that we value our ability to reason (broadly understood) abilities that seem more basic and which may make reason possible. In this way we are a microcosm of the universe So just as we value one aspect of ourselves over others, so too do we regard some parts of the universe over others. The highest part can do whatever the lower does... plus more.
Integral to Dembski's idea of specified complexity (SC) is the notion that something extrinsic to evolution is the source of the specification in how it develops. He compares SC to the message sent by space aliens in the movie "Contact." In that movie, earthbound scientists determine that radio waves originating in from somewhere in our galaxy are actually a signal being sent by space aliens. The scientists determine that these waves are a signal is the fact that they indicate prime numbers in a way that a random occurrence would not. What is interesting to me is the fact that Dembski relies upon an analogy with a sign rather than a machine. Like a machine, signs are produced by an intelligent being for the sake of something beyond themselves. Machines, if you will, have a meaning. Signs, if you will, produce knowledge. But the meaning/knowledge is in both cases something other than the machine/sign itself. Both signs and machines are purposeful or teleological
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My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason.
The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His hands" of God; one might also say, "He's got the whole world in his mind." So there's a sense that in order for "my world" to make sense, so does yours: yours has to make sense too, because we all live in the same world (the "we" being all rational creatures).
Oh well, that's just a sketch, but here's some background.
As I composed this argument, I had in the back of my mind something a French Catholic philosopher named Jacques Maritain pointed out in The Person and the Common Good: that there is a kind of infinity to the human person. It's as if we take the whole cosmos w/n our thought. Add to that what some Rennaissance dude said about man as microcosm, and its almost as if we model, in our governance of our bodily movements, the divine governance.
Naming is part of this god-like way we imitate divine providence. For naming is disinguising forms of being in terms of their purpose, which purpose is related to the purpose of the whole, which whole can be thematized by us humans and not by chimps.
Oh well, that's my story an' I'm stickin' to it :)
My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason.
The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His hands" of God; one might also say, "He's got the whole world in his mind." So there's a sense that in order for "my world" to make sense, so does yours: yours has to make sense too, because we all live in the same world (the "we" being all rational creatures).
Oh well, that's just a sketch, but here's some background.
As I composed this argument, I had in the back of my mind something a French Catholic philosopher named Jacques Maritain pointed out in The Person and the Common Good: that there is a kind of infinity to the human person. It's as if we take the whole cosmos w/n our thought. Add to that what some Rennaissance dude said about man as microcosm, and its almost as if we model, in our governance of our bodily movements, the divine governance.
Naming is part of this god-like way we imitate divine providence. For naming is disinguising forms of being in terms of their purpose, which purpose is related to the purpose of the whole, which whole can be thematized by us humans and not by chimps.
Oh well, that's my story an' I'm stickin' to it :)
My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason.
I tried to post more in the comments, but google wouldn't let me, so I'm creating a new link...