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Does the law of entropy apply to the universe as a whole?

If one says that it doesn't, then wouldn't one have to explain why the universe is different from other wholes; otherwise one will be guilty of special pleading...
[Tim, what do you think? ]
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Unknown said…
Unknown. It depends on whether the universe is a closed system. If the universe is spatially infinite, it would seem that the answer is no - because at any particular place in the universe, the radius of its "closed" (i.e. closed system in the entropic sense) part is increasing with time, and has a radius of light_speed * age_of_universe.
11:05 AM
Leo White said…
Uh, I didn't catch your drift. I'll chat with you and ask you to draw pictures (good luck with the picture of an infinite universe).

In which case is the universe a closed system: if infinite or if finite?

Would your reply be that, in the case of a spatially finite universe, the system is "open" and hence the Law of Entropy applies?
4:24 PM
Leo White said…
I think I was unclear (especially at the beginning) in my previous comment. I get that you are saying an infinite system is closed, but I don't get why this is so. Also, why would we refer to a finite universe as open?

Maybe this is clearer...
4:27 PM
Unknown said…
Given the finite age to the universe we know from the big bang, there's a limit at any given moment on the cosmic "timeline" to what can be influencing you casually. Imagine a pair of galaxies two billion light years away from each other sometime near the beginning of the universe. (There weren't any galaxies near the beginning, but that's beside the point.) The universe would have to be two billion years old before an observer from one galaxy can see the other galaxy. The light-speed-limit applies to all causation as well as light. (For example, if you had a wooden pole that stretched from here to Pluto, and you pushed on the pole, the other end of the pole wouldn't respond to the push until ten hours later.) So back to entropy - to talk about it meaningfully, you need some sort of "box", some closed space that's open or closed. So given the finite speed of light and the finite age of the universe, every location in the universe, entropically, exists in a spherical "box" that's continually expanding, and thus letting things inside more and more. So if the universe is spatially finite, there would be a time in the far future where the radius of this sphere would equal the lengthscale of the entire universe, and then it would become a closed "box". If the universe is infinite spatially, then it will never become closed, and it would seem to me that the law of entropy wouldn't apply on the large scale.
1:16 PM
Unknown said…
See the Cosmology section here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy#Consequences_and_applications
1:40 PM
Unknown said…
Evidence that this is an unresolved question:

http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id/63190/title/A_New_View_of_Gravity
3:09 PM
Leo White said…
Thanks. I can't check the links right now, but you have at least convinced me of my ignorance.
9:32 PM
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