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God of the expanding/contracting gaps (pick one)

Proponents of intelligent design deny that random variation combined with natural and sexual selection suffices to originate the present diversity of life forms. It seems to them that any adequate explanation must include an intelligent designer. But they differ among themselves about what that intelligent designer must be like and what it has done. Did it engineer the present life forms pretty much as they are now? Creationists will say yes, but not all IDers are creationists. Did it just engineer the first cell and let the rest unfold? Sometimes ID proponents seem to suggest this (e.g., Michael Behe). Must that engineer have been God? Most will deny that the scientific method could demonstrate that God is the cause of a natural phenomenon; others, however, will insist that ID shows that the world was made by no less than God.

Opponents of ID seem to have only the latter crowd in mind. They respond that it is all really religion belief in the disguise of science. Obviously IDers are ultimately concerned about God, but if the premises and conclusion of the arguments proffered by the IDers don't even mention God, then the religion-in-disguise objection is irrelevant. Instead of addressing the question of whether the actually stated premises are true and whether they support the conclusion, opponents spend all of their energy insisting that the argument cannot as a matter of principle, be a sound one.

Opponents object that ID relies upon a God of the gaps argument. Well, IF an IDer concludes that divine intervention is needed to bring about an observed process, then, yes, God is filling a gap. But as Dinesh D'Souza points out in his book on immortality, every theory is an attempt to fill an explanatory gap. So the ID opponent has to add one of the following qualifications to that objection.

First, one may add that science as such cannot draw an inference about the existence of God. This objection is based upon one's understanding of the very nature of the scientific method rather than being based upon some experimental verification. Certainly scientists are entitled to form an opinion about who is and who is not doing real science.

It is important to note, however, that this objection applies only to those forms of ID that aspire to prove that apparent design in nature needs a divine cause. The truth is that most proponents of ID are arguing for a much weaker conclusion (as William Lane Craig says in a debate, "Zeus will do!"). To object to anything that such IDers may say on the basis that it may used to support religious claims is to take a reactionary position against a perceived threat to truth. A much better way to uphold the truth is simply to listen to the argument being presented and evaluate it on its merits.

Secondly, one may argue that no rational discourse of any sort may be employed in justifying the claim that God exists. For there is an infinite gap between Creator and creator, and this gap is so great that one can't infer anything about the former on the basis of the characteristics of the latter. At least not by operating according to the scientific method. But this premise, while deserving serious consideration, is a philosophical rather than a scientific argument. Science as we know it is not competent to comment about the infinity or knowability of God. While anyone, including a scientist, may place this objection, they may not do so in the name of science.

Thirdly, the opponent can object that the gap is closing anyways: it is just a matter of time before the equivalent of the missing link is found, etc. Furthermore, even if the natural way of filling that gap is never found, the mere absence of such evidence that a natural gap is present is not in itself evidence that only God can fill it. It must be admitted that our overall expectations regarding where and how things are developing is integral to how we interpret particular events. IDers believe the gap is getting wider while their opponents believe it is getting smaller: here, in my opinion lies the heart of the controversy. Here is where opponents of ID sound rather.... religious in their convictions about what science can do.

The objection that ID commits the argument from ignorance fallacy is valid if the proposer has no evidence whatsoever. But if there already seem to be many indications in life that there is a God whose actions are efficacious, then filling this particular gap with something divine or preternatural is no more irrational than the many plausible explanations we make in our day to day activity. For the convinced atheist, however, everything seems to indicate that there is no God, and the ID proponent's advocay looks like a person who is losing a debate grasping at one last straw. At this point it becomes apparent that the two sides of this debate should be talking about the bigger picture rather than biology and evolution.

Of course, there are theistic opponents of ID, but their opposition is to the supernaturalism that they associate with ID. That is, they see nature itself, even without miracles, as profoundly indicative of the efficacy of God, so that ID arguments appear to them both superfluous and misleading. Or they may believe that science offers better evidence of God's existence. The theists Steve Barr and Kevin Miller, for example, criticize ID but embrace the anthropic principle, with is a kind of cosmic ID theory.

Comments

Unknown said…
Could your rephrase your question as - what is the boundary between science and philosophy? Is there one?

I would also add a problem with ID - God is not a testable hypothesis. You would have to be able to perform some experiment or observation that would demonstrate divine existence. How is that possible?
Leo White said…
Thank you for your helpful comment,
Tim. I revised the post in response to the second question you asked. As for the first, I don't think that there is a boundary between the two: science starts with philosophical convictions and those convictions guide science. Science seems most philosophical when it undergoes a radical change. But the two approaches do differ. The focus on the quantitative is proper to science not to philosophy. Also, if the two are not divorcible AND philosophy has something to say about God, then there has to be some connection between science and God. I think there is such a connection, but it is not the sort that would allow one to determine whether or not God exists by means of a lab-experiment. Rather, it would consist of looking at the presuppositions of science and recognizing that those presuppositions are both philosophical AND that they point to God.

Or something like that...
Leo White said…
Actually, I put that post up BEFORE I did the revision that I mentioned... I hope you got a chance to look it over again.
Leo White said…
Rephrase: "if there already seem to be many indications in life that there is a God whose actions are efficacious..." replace "God" with "Higher rational being" so as to leave open-ended (to the supernatural) in a way that can't be shot down as inherently supernaturalistic.

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