Skip to main content

Darwin and racism

Darwin he believes that different races have different levels of intellectual ability and that for this reason he expects the better adapted races to replace others. He repeatedly contrasts the "civilized" with the "savage" races, and suggests that the former are more evolved. For example, he points out that those from the African continent have a better developed sense of smell and that this characteristic is even more robust in dogs and chimps. More strikingly, he quotes an expert who compares the jaws of various races, and finds that the shorter jaw and late developed molars in Europeans (in comparison with those of Africans) are evidence that they have been less needed as the former have been eating cooked food longer. He also approvingly quotes at length another scientists who contrasts the impulsive Irish with the frugal Scot, noting with regret how the former are more likely to reproduce.

In other words, Darwin is a racist... and a Victorian bigot.

When he first introduces the contrasts between the races, however, it is cast not just in terms of natural selection/variation, but in terms of improvements brought about by use/disuse. In other words, Darwin is embraces the Larmarkian thesis that use/disuse affect ones progeny. Interesting that, when it comes to human evolution, he finds nothing inconsistent in giving this sort of account on one page and natural selection on another.

His embrace of Lamarkian explanations of how humans differ from non-humans and how human races differ from each other renders the present debate about evolution somewhat comical. Proponents of Darwinism assume that Darwinism means the affirmation that random variation, natural selection and sexual selection account for the diversity of our present species. Anything added to this is anti-Darwinian. So I guess Darwin himself is not "Darwinian" as understood by his contemporary proponents. Then again, his detractors also accept the claim that the same three principles help account for the variation found in the species, but they then (thinking here of Behe) attack "Darwinian evolution" as if Darwin had no room for anything beyond random variation, as well as natural and sexual selection. Darwin may have left no room for creationist supernaturalism, but he left the door open for some kind of teleology being involved in the origin of new variations--as long as it was of the naturalistic kind.

Moral of the story. Both sides should separate the abstract principle (that random variation natural selection/sexual selection account for the variation in the species) from the opinions held by Darwin the man. Proponents should avoid calling themselves Darwinians inasmuch as they definitely do not aspire to describe and explain differences in the races in the same way that he did. And also, unlike Darwin, they are rightly opposed to Lamarkian explanation. Opponents should stop overlooking the Lamarkian side of Darwin. They should instead point out that (as I argue below), it places a burden of proof on the contemporary Darwinian (whom we'll call the neo-Darwinian for more than one reason) to explain how their take on evolution does NOT lead to racism. Also, they should point out that if Darwin can, without inconsistency be open to something other than random variation, natural selection and sexual selection as a partial natural explanations of the variation of the species, they can too. As long as the explanation can be tested scientifically, it should be taken seriously in scientific discussions. The problem is, of course, that the explanation sounds too much like a supernatural one to so-called Darwinians, and that is another issue for another day.

In defense of Darwin but NOT in defense of his racism: It is worth noting that Lamarkian evolution is much more supportive of racism than the combination of random variation and natural selection. Consider how a Lamarkian looks at cultural differences: some cultures are more advanced than others. And individuals who live a more cultured life are going to have babies that are more capable of cultural achievments. In other words, superior cultures breed superior babies. With Lamark, cultural superiority quickly brings about biological superiority.

Such is NOT the case if evolution is a result of random variation plus natural selection. One who believes only in natural selection and random variation and who rejects Lamarkian use/disuse insists that the practices of a society do NOT influence the quality of the gene pool. So if Darwin is a racist (and he is) it is not so much because he is Darwinian as because he is Lamarkian. Or even better, an ethnocentric, Victorian Lamarkian.

It is easy now to see why the cultural elites in the early 20th century believed in eugenics: they were Darwinians (that is, Lamarkian Darwinians). In fact, Darwin himself comes to the precipice of suggesting Eugenics. He points out that (as he believes) the tendency to commit crimes can be inherited. And he notes that our tendency to care for the sick the the stupid will bring down our genetic pool. He shows some regret for the fact that the latter will happen, but accepts it as a natural (but not that desirable) consequence of our social instincts. He expresses the wish that those who are maimed or mentally deficient would not reproduce (he says something to the effect that it is "to be hoped for than expected that the weak in body and mind will refrain from marriage"), but he does not seem willing to suggest that they be prevented from doing so.

Add to everything that I have noted one more bit of evidence: Darwin refers to Spencer in The Descent of Man as a "great philosopher," and one strongly suspects that he, like Spencer, was a "Social Darwinist." He was enthusiastic about superior races replacing the inferior. How ironic that he was born on the same day as Abraham Lincoln!

Of course, one who accepts Darwin's original contributions to biology need not be a racist. Simply by rejecting Lamark one will deprive racists of much of their biological sounding basis. But it is worth noting that there is absolutely NOTHING in Darwin's combination of random variation and natural selection that forces one to reject racism. For the classically Darwinian thesis about evolution is not inconsistent with Lamark at all (i.e., both can be considered subalternate explanations), and a Lamarkian version of evolution quickly becomes racist.

When faced with the inadequacy of classically Darwinian theory to oppose racism, one can say that equality is not a biological thesis but an ethical claim. This might be true, but it would seem that ethics is in some way tied to human nature. If so, then there is something quite unsatisfactory about the complete refusal of an egalitarian who is also a Darwinian to relate the "ought" of ethics in any way to the "is" of human nature. Such a refusal seems like a bit of legerdemain when it is made by a positivist--one who thinks that only scientific accounts can claim to be objective and rational.

Comments

Unknown said…
Very interesting. I had heard something about this on some podcast but never realized the extent to which Darwin himself was a "social Darwinist". I wonder how much some of these view preceded him - like in Thomas Malthus, for example?
Leo White said…
In my opinion, he got the idea of the struggle for survival (that is, the struggle with others of the same species as well as of other species for the same resources) from Malthus. The lecturer said that social Darwinism is a misnomer because that English, utilitarian, classically liberal, don't-bother-to-help-the-poor attitude was there before Darwin published his ideas about evolution. Yes, he isn't the source of those ideas; yes they supplied insights integral to his version of evolution. Yes, it might be more appropo to call him a biological Malthusian than it is to call Spencer as social Darwinist. But Darwin approved of Spencer, calling him a "great philosopher." This fact is surely an embarrassment to Pinker...
Leo White said…
In fairness I should add that in the Descent of Man Darwin approves of laws aimed at helping the poor (while noting how it harms the genetic stock of humanity). So he is not 100% aliigned with Spencer, who would say not to bother to help the poor, as they are less fit for survival.

Popular posts from this blog

Dembski's "specified compexity" semiotics and teleology (both ad intra and ad extra)

Integral to Dembski's idea of specified complexity (SC) is the notion that something extrinsic to evolution is the source of the specification in how it develops. He compares SC to the message sent by space aliens in the movie "Contact." In that movie, earthbound scientists determine that radio waves originating in from somewhere in our galaxy are actually a signal being sent by space aliens. The scientists determine that these waves are a signal is the fact that they indicate prime numbers in a way that a random occurrence would not. What is interesting to me is the fact that Dembski relies upon an analogy with a sign rather than a machine. Like a machine, signs are produced by an intelligent being for the sake of something beyond themselves. Machines, if you will, have a meaning. Signs, if you will, produce knowledge. But the meaning/knowledge is in both cases something other than the machine/sign itself. Both signs and machines are purposeful or teleological

continuing the discussion with Tim in a new post

Hi Tim, I am posting my reply here, because the great blogmeister won't let me put it all in a comment. Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift). My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason. The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His han

particular/universal event/rule

While listening to a recorded lecture on Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, it occurred to me that every rule is in a way, a fact about the world. Think about baseball: from the p.o.v. of an individual player, a baseball rule is not a thing but a guide for acting and interpreting the actions of others.  But this rule, like the action it guides, is part of a concrete individual --i.e., part of an institution that has come into existence at a particular place and time, has endured and  may eventually go out of existence.  The baseball rule, as a feature of that individual, is likewise individual.  The term "baseball rule," on the one hand, links us to a unique cultural event; it can, on the other hand, name a certain type of being.  In this way, it transgresses the boundary between proper and common noun. If there were no such overlap, then we might be tempted to divide our ontology between a bunch of facts "out there" and a bunch of common nouns "in here.&qu